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I. INTRODUCrION
From 1991-92, the world witnessed miraculous changes. From
the dissolution of the communist bloc and the Union of Soviet So-
cialist Republics ("USSR") arose several new nations. Throughout
this period of change, however, one condition remained constant:
the environment remained in a state of crisis.'
1. Although this Comment focuses on Armenia's environmental crisis, other
former members of the USSR inherited environmental problems as well. See gener-
ally Stephanie Gillette, Comment, Nuclear Energy Crisis in the Former Soviet Union:
Will the Nuclear Energy Protocol of the European Energy Charter Provide the Necessary Solu-
tions?, 5 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REv. 375, 375 (1993). For example, on March 24,
1992, a Chernobyl-type reactor at the Sosnovy Bor power station near St. Peters-
burg, Russia, leaked radioactive iodine into the atmosphere. Id. Similar events
have led to global concern over the reactors inherited from the former USSR. Id.
Experts believe that the heirs lack the skill, knowledge, and funds to run the reac-
tors safely. Id. at 376.
(163)
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The environmental crises these new nations face are the result
of years of neglect by the former USSR. Faced with the choice be-
tween environmental protection and economic development, the
former USSR selected the latter.2 The newly independent repub-
lics now face the same choice, but under even more dire circum-
stances. For instance, Armenia is in extreme economic turmoil.
3
The new nation lacks food, energy, and heat. With another harsh
winter fast approaching, Armenia needs answers to its economic
and energy problems. In the eyes of the government, the solution
is to reopen Medzamor, a nuclear power plant which was shut down
This fear has promulgated neighboring nations to develop assistance pro-
grams to aid the former republics. Id. at 377. The new nations require assistance
because they are dependent on nuclear energy. Id. at 375-82 (stating that depen-
dence stems from devastated economies and lack of hard currency needed to shift
energy production to other sectors). Despite the danger the reactors pose, the
former Soviet citizens require heat to survive the harsh "Soviet" winters. Id. at 376.
This dilemma is precisely the predicament in which Armenia finds itself.
For a comprehensive discussion on the Commonwealth of Independent
States' ("CIS") lack of alternatives to nuclear reactors, see Gillette, supra. For a
discussion on the different designs of USSR reactors including diagrams, see Philip
P. Ketchian, The History and Environmental Impact of Nuclear Power in Armenia, THE
ARMENIAN MIRROR-SPECTATOR, Sept. 25, 1993, at 8 [hereinafter Ketchian, Part Two].
2. For a discussion of how the former Soviet Union traded the environment
for economic development, see infra notes 13-21 and accompanying text.
There is some indication that the former USSR was not alone in its pursuit of
economic advances at the expense of the environment. For a discussion of global
neglect of the environment, see Roseann Eshbach, Comment, A Global Approach to
the Protection of the Environment: Balancing State Sovereignty and Global Interests, 4
TEMP. INT'L & CoMP. L.J. 271 (1990).
The international community has recently recognized the need to intercon-
nect environmental concerns with economic concerns. In June 1992, the United
Nations Conference on Environment and Development ("UNCED") identified five
key elements of sustainable development:
1) [E]mphasis on quality of life rather than on sustained production of
commodities;
2) a broadened concept integrating pollution and natural resources with the
whole natural environment;
3) treating the environment as an economic resource;
4) differentiating between developed and developing countries' responsibili-
ties for global environmental damage and for response measures to poten-
tially damaging activities; and
5) concern with broader national policies, strategies, and practices.
Mukul Sanwal, Sustainable Development, the Rio Declaration and Multilateral Coopera-
tion, 4 COLO.J. INT'L Err. L. & POL'Y 45, 45-46 (1993). Countries are to work on
decreasing the disparity in standards of living and promote an international eco-
nomic system that will support the environment. Id. at 50. The focus on economic
concerns will also include increased participation in international agreements
from Nongovernmental Organizations ("NGOs"). Id. at 58-59. For additional in-
formation on NGOs, see Edith B. Weiss, International Environmental Law. Contempo-
rary Issues and the Emergence of a New World Order, 81 GEO. L.J. 675 (1993).
3. For a discussion of Armenia's dire situation, see infra notes 91-111 and ac-
companying text.
[Vol. V: p. 163
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in 1989. 4 The Armenian government expects the reopening will
stimulate the economy and produce the energy needed to run fac-
tories and heat homes.
Although this solution seems ideal, there is a critical problem:
Medzamor is extremely unstable.5 The plant is situated at a point
where forty fault lines converge. 6 In addition, the plant has deterio-
rated since its shutdown and experts believe that Armenia does not
have the funds to reopen it safely. 7 Furthermore, Armenia is al-
ready one of the most polluted former Soviet republics.8 Thus, like
the former USSR, the republic must choose between the environ-
ment and the economy. However, unlike the former USSR, this
choice is complicated by Armenia's struggle to survive and the need
to feed and heat its citizenry.
This Comment first traces the history of environmental pollu-
tion in Armenia. It examines the period of Soviet domination and
shows how economic development overshadowed environmental
concerns. Second, it explores Armenia's struggle to survive and ex-
plains why that struggle has caused the republic to consider reopen-
ing the unstable nuclear power plant. Next, this Comment
examines customary international duties in international environ-
mental law. Finally, this Comment addresses Armenia's duties in
reopening the plant and explores whether foreign nations have an
obligation to ensure a safe reopening.
4. Michael Parks, Soviets Closing A-Plant Due to Fear of Quakes, L.A. TiMES, Feb.
26, 1989, at 1, 14.
5. Id.
6. Michael Gray, Environmental Pollution Reaches Dangerous Proportions In Arme-
nia, CAL. COURIER, Jan. 22, 1987, at 7. Medzamor was the first USSR nuclear reac-
tor built in a seismically active area. Ketchian, Part Two, supra note 1, at 8, 9. The
Arabian plate and Eurasian plate are converging underneath the area of
Medzamor's location. Id. Since the Abu-Samsar fault zone is 30 miles west of
Medzamor, geologists have indicated that a powerful earthquake, measuring 10 on
the former USSR's MSK-64 scale is a possibility. Id. Medzamor was built only to
withstand an earthquake measuring 8 on the MSK-64 scale. Id. at 8. For a further
discussion of the seismic nature of the area surrounding Medzamor (including a
map of epicenters) see Ketchian, Part Two, supra note 1, at 8.
7. See Tony Haplin, Cold Comfort ARMENIAN IN-r'L MAG., Mar. 1992, at 12, 13.
Neither the atomic state inspector nor Medzamor's vice-director believe that the
funds allocated to Medzamor are enough to open it safely. Id.
8. See Editors of Raparakainutyun, Armenia Threatened With Biological Death, 10-
11 GLASNOST INFo. BULL. 1987, at 8 [hereinafter Raparakainutyun].
19941
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II. THE ROOTS OF ARMENIA'S ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS: THE
SOVIET BEGINNING
A. Soviet Environmental Development
Historically, the USSR was environmentally unenlightened un-
til the mid-1960s. 9 The USSR initially believed that only a socialist,
not a capitalist, economy could guarantee environmental protec-
tion. 10 Theoretically, socialism promotes harmony between man
and his environment by placing both the means of production and
the state's natural resources in the people's possession. 1 Thus, the
people should promote the welfare of both. Ironically, in practice
socialism has actually doomed the environment. 12 Under a socialist
system, there is no price attached to the use of natural resources
because they belong equally and freely to everyone.' 3 Since there is
no charge for using resources, factories are not motivated to con-
serve. 14 In a socialist society, conservation is unprofitable; there-
fore, it is avoided.' 5
9. Charles E. Ziegler, The Politics of Pollution in the Soviet Union and East Europe,
Two Years After Chernobyi; COMM'N ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUR. DIG., Apr.
26, 1988, at 3; see also W. E. BUTLER, SOVIET LAW 274-276 (1988) (discussing Soviet
ecological history). The Soviet people believed that the USSR was so enormous
that it would never run out of natural resources. Daniel Sneider, The Soviet
"Ecocidal" Legacy, CHRISTIAN SCL MONiTOR, June 11, 1992, at 10. This belief led to
wasteful practices. Id. For instance, orders would be given to mine a single metal
from a mountain and then leave the rest as wasteland. Id.
10. Eugene N. Lisitsyn, Environmental Law and Management in the USSR- A Re-
flection on Contemporary Reforms, 17 REv. SocLAusT L. 125, 133-34 (1991).
11. Michael Gray, High Price for Rapid Industrial Growth, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 4,
1987, at A18, A19 [hereinafter Gray, High Price]; see also BUTLER, supra note 9, at
274-76 (discussing the relationship of Marxist-Leninism to environmental
protection).
12. Robert G. Darst, Jr., Environmentalism in the USSR.- The Opposition to the River
Diversion Projects, 4 SOVIET ECON. 223, 233 (1988). Since the mid-1970s, the former
USSR realized that socialist ideas themselves would not ensure conservation. See
BUTLER, supra note 9, at 274-76. Only then did the government incorporate con-
servation into the national economic plan. Id.; see also Sneider, supra note 9, at 10
(discussing a variety of Soviet environmental problems, including the pollution
from giant steel complex in Magnitogorsk and Chelyabinsk-65, largest nuclear-
waste reprocessing site where unprocessed waste is stored and risk of seepage into
Siberian rivers is high).
13. Darst, supra note 12, at 233.
14. Id.
15. Id. The USSR's system serves as a good example of this principle. Produc-
tivity had pervasive detrimental effects on the Soviet environment and governed
much Soviet action. For instance, even though the former USSR had many envi-
ronmental laws, these laws were unenforced in order to ensure economic produc-
tivity. Lisitsyn, supra note 10, at 135; see also MURRAY FESHBACH & ALFRED FRIENDLY,
JR., EcoCIDE IN THE USSR 91-110 (1992) (discussing sacrifice of health and environ-
ment for production). The former Soviet government punished and rewarded
each enterprise according to whether it met its production plan; therefore, an
[Vol. V: p. 163
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The former USSR recognized the interrelationship of eco-
nomic expansion and environmental protection only a few years
before its dissolution.1 6 This awareness resulted from such inci-
dents as the Chernobyl nuclear power plant accident,' 7 the pollu-
enterprise would focus on meeting production targets, not on protecting the envi-
ronment. Darst, supra note 12, at 233. For instance, although there was a reward
for meeting production targets, there was none for installing anti-pollution de-
vices. Id.
Ultimately, in order to support the economy, environmental protection laws
were rendered meaningless by decisions, resolutions, and regulations. Lisitsyn,
supra note 10, at 134.
16. Lisitsyn, supra note 10, at 125-26, 129-32. Despite this realization and the
former USSR's attempts to cope with environmental problems, by 1990 the USSR's
environmental protection policies were seen as a hinderance to an already suffer-
ing economy. FESHBACH & FRIENDLY, supra note 15, at 248. Environmentalists were
criticized for decreasing production levels of needed items and for leaving the
country dependent on imports. Id. at 248-49. Environmental proponents argued
that without cleaner air and water people could not survive to sustain the econ-
omy. Id. at 253-56.
17. See Martin Sieff, Environmental Movement Gains in Soviet Union, WASH.
TIMES, Apr. 8, 1988, at A10. Chernobyl, an atomic power station, exploded in April
1986. See Bill Keller, Public Mistrust Curbs Soviet Nuclear Power Efforts, N.Y. TIMEs,
Oct. 13, 1988, at Al [hereinafter Keller, Public Mistrust]; see Parks, supra note 4, at
14 (mentioning Chernobyl-related deaths and injuries). Chernobyl was located
near Pripyat in the former USSR. Keller, Public Mistrus supra, at Al. It was 72
miles from Kiev, Ukrane. FESHBACH & FRIENDLY, supra note 15, at 12.
The explosion was attributed to general apathy among members of the
USSR's Ministry of Atomic Energy. Quentin Peel, N-industy Criticized in Pravda,
FIN. TiMEs, May 23, 1988, at 3. The equipment and training in the nuclear indus-
try deteriorated as the industry grew. Id. Although the members were warned
about the inadequate safety standards, they failed to act. Id.
The Chernobyl accident was the first major disaster at a nuclear plant. Paul C.
Szasz, International Responsibility for Manmade Disasters, 1987 AM. Soc'v INT'L L.
PRoc. 320. It was rated the maximum seven on the International Nuclear Event
Scale. Gillette, supra note 1, at 375. The accident contaminated the USSR and its
many republics. See Philip P. Ketchian, An Update on the Environmental Crisis in
Armenia, ARMENIAN WKLY., OCt. 17, 1992, at 8 [hereinafter Ketchian, Environmental
Crisis in Armenia].
The fallout from Chernobyl also contaminated eastern and western Europe.
Alan E. Boyle, Nuclear Energy and International Law: An Environmental Perspective, LX
BRrr. Y.B. INT'L L. 257 (1989). The explosion rained radioactive materials on
Ukrainian farms and towns, farmlands in Poland and Sweden, and reindeer pas-
tures in the Arctic. Bill Keller, Soviet Scraps a New Atomic Plant In Face of Protest Over
Chernobyl, N.Y. TiMES, Jan. 28, 1988, A9 [hereinafter Keller, Soviet Scraps a New
Atomic Plant]; Christopher C. Joyner, Book Note, 85 AM.J. INT'L L. 584,585 (1991).
Even the United States received radioactive fallout. Developments-International En-
vironmental Law, 104 HARv. L. Rzv. 1487 (1991) (citing Sullivan, Fallout Found in
U.S. Is Said to Pose No Risk, N.Y. TIMs, May 13, 1986, at A6); Schmemann, Delay
Reported on Evacuation at Nuclear Site, N.Y. TiMES, May 7, 1986, at Al. In fact, more
radioactive material entered the atmosphere from the Chernobyl accident than
from the Hiroshima and Nagasaki atomic bombings. FESHBACH & FRIENDLY, supra
note 15, at 12. As a result, food chains were contaminated. Peter Obstler, Toward
a Wor*ing Solution to Global Pollution: Importing CERCLA to Regulate the Export of Haz-
ardous Waste, 16 YALEJ. INT'L L. 73, 80 (1991). The effects of this widespread con-
tamination will last for decades. Jonathan Turley, "When in Rome": Multinational
19941
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tion of Lake Baikal in Siberia,18 and the depletion of the Aral Sea.19
In 1985, the Soviet government fully realized that the USSR's envi-
ronmental laws were neither followed nor properly enforced, 20 as
pollution exceeded permissible levels in 104 Soviet cities.2 1 In re-
sponse, the USSR formed the State Committee on Environment/
Misconduct and the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 84 Nw. U. L. REv. 598, 640-
41 (1990).
Economically, the Chernobyl disaster cost the USSR billions of dollars. Keller,
Soviet Scraps a New Atomic Plant, supra, at A9; see FESHBACH & FRIENDLY, supra note
15, at 143-56 (discussing aftermath and costs of Chernobyl). Prior to the
Chernobyl accident, nuclear power plants were considered profitable and helpful
to the regions that possessed them. Keller, Soviet Scraps a New Atomic Plant, supra, at
Al. The government gave those regions more attention-more jobs, more hous-
ing, more cultural amenities-than other regions. Id. After the disaster, the eco-
nomic cost of nuclear energy became apparent and spurred the former USSR's
recognition of environmental concerns. Id. at A9. It is interesting to note that
most reforms were made in recognition of the economic costs of pollution such as
Chernobyl, not the health costs. Ziegler, supra note 9, at 3.
18. Lake Baikal is located in Siberia. FESHBACH & FRIENDLY, supra note 15, at
112. This lake is the deepest and eighth-largest in the world. Id. at 116. It holds
one-fifth of the earth's fresh water. Don Belt, The World's Great Lake, NAT'L GEo-
GRAPHIC, June 1992, at 2. The lake is over 25 million years old and contains 1,500
species. Id. at 20. The lake was polluted by cellulose-cord processing factories
which produced heavy-duty tire cord. FESHBACH & FRIENDLY, supra note 15, at 117-
18. Soviet planners wanted to produce this cord domestically rather than rely on
imports. Id. at 118; see also Belt, supra, at 8. Although the Soviets eventually discov-
ered a synthetic material that was better suited for these tires, the plant still func-
tions. Belt, supra, at 32; see also FESHBACH & FRIENDLY, supra note 15, at 119
(explaining plant's projects after need for cellulose cord vanished).
For further information on the USSR's water pollution, see FESHBACH &
FRIENDLY, supra note 15, at 113-130 (discussing "Water Torture" in former USSR).
19. The Aral Sea is located between the former Soviet republics of Kazakhstan
and Uzbekistan. FESHBACH & FRIENDLY, supra note 15, at 72. For the past thirty
years, its flow was diverted for massive irrigation and its waters were saturated with
fertilizers, herbicides, and pesticides used in cotton production. Id. at 74. The
destruction of the sea was hushed in an effort to become a net exporter of cotton,
the area's "white gold." William S. Ellis, A Soviet Sea Lies Dying, NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC,
Feb. 1990, at 72, 76. More than forty percent of the Aral's surface water has turned
to salt and sand in the past thirty years and its volume has decreased by two-thirds.
Id. at 72-73; see also FESHBACH & FRIENDLY, supra note 15, at 73-88 (discussing evapo-
ration of Aral Sea and its consequences).
Despite the pervasive detrimental effects of the loss of the sea on the health of
the people and the loss of work in the fishing field, some argue that the cost of
saving the Aral Sea is too high. Ellis, supra, at 72-92. The critics question how the
irrigation workers will be fed if irrigation is stopped. Id. at 92. Thus, even in the
face of destruction some Soviets fail to see the long-term consequences of their
actions. Id.
20. Nicholas A. Robinson & Gary R. Waxmonsky, The U.S.-U.S.S.R Agreement
to Protect the Environment: 15 Years of Cooperation, 18 ENvTrL. L. 403, 431 (1988).
21. Sieff, supra note 17, at A10.
[Vol. V.: p. 163
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Nature Protection ("SCEP")22 in 1988.23 The purpose of this com-
mittee was "to centralize and modernize environmental administra-
tion and regulate the use of natural resources ... "24 SCEP was
responsible for everything "from the siting of industrial waste
dumps to the issuing of hunting licenses."2 5 Furthermore, SCEP
had the power to enforce all Soviet environmental laws.26
22. The SCEP was also known as "Goskompriroda." Lisitsyn, supra note 10, at
129. In 1991, SCEP became the USSR Ministry on Environmental Protection and
the Use of Natural Resources. Id.
23. Darst, supra note 12, at 237. This agency was a combination of all the
agencies and departments that formerly dealt with the environment. Id. SCEP was
comparable to the United States' Environmental Protection Agency; both have ex-
clusive control over the environment. Michael Axline, (Out) Back in the USSR: A
Review of Charles Ziegler's Environmental Policy in the USSR, 18 ENvr'L L. 383, 384
(1988). SCEP was advised by "a council of scholars, public figures, representatives
of local soviets, and enterprise directors." BUrrLR, supra note 9, at 283.
24. Ziegler, supra note 9, at 6. SCEP had been suggested by Soviet environ-
mentalists for years. Id. See generally Parks, supra note 4, at 14 (discussing promises
of environmental protection by Soviet authorities).
25. Wien the Fishing Had to Stop, ECONOMIST, Feb. 6, 1988, at 46. The principal
functions of the SCEP included:
[E]ffecting the integrated administration of nature protection activities in
the country; developing and implementing a unified scientific-technical
policy in nature conservation and the rational use of natural resources;
co-ordinating the relevant activities of other ministries and departments;
State control over the use and protection of all lands, water, atmosphere,
flora, fauna, minerals, and the marine environment; preparation and sub-
mission of proposals to the State Planning Committee for inclusion in the
long-term environmental planning schemes; control over the implemen-
tation of planning tasks; confirmation of ecological normative standards,
rules, and standards directed against pollution; performing State expert
ecological evaluations of general schemes for developing and siting new
plants and factories; control over the observance of ecological norms
when new technology and materials are developed, as well as over the
environmental impact of new construction; the issuance of permits for
the burial of wastes, for discharges of harmful substances into the envi-
ronment, for special use of water, wildlife, air, and land; direction of
game preserves, hunting, and protected species, and co-operation with
foreign countries and international organisations [sic] in environmental
matters.
BUT ER, supra note 9, at 282.
26. Robinson & Waxmonsky, supra note 20, at 432. SCEP had the power to
prohibit the construction, renovation, and expansion of industries. BtrrLR, supra
note 9, at 283. It also had the power to bring suit against violators and suspend
enterprises that exploited the environment. Id. In addition, decisions by SCEP
were binding on "all ministries, departments, associations, enterprises, and organi-
zations." Id.
Despite the power SCEP was given and its eventual elevation to a Ministry in
1991, it lacked the information and authority it needed to be effective. See
FESHBACH & FRIENDLY, supra note 15, at 245. For instance, it did not have power
over the State Committee on Hydrometerology, the agency that collected data on
the condition of air and water resources. Id. It also lacked the power to halt,
modify, or inspect other state agencies' development plans. Id. In 1989, SCEP's
chief stated that the lack of an environmental turnaround was due to "the prevail-
1994]
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Early on, SCEP found that the USSR lacked the infrastructure
required to implement complex environmental reforms.2 7 The
USSR needed an infrastructure that would encourage, with eco-
nomic incentives, the rational use of resources and the end of pol-
lution.28 Therefore, SCEP first restructured state institutions and
organizations. 29
The former USSR also turned to legal solutions. The drafters
of the new National Environmental Protection Law30 suggested the
inclusion of concepts new to Soviet law, the introduction of specific
environmental crimes.31 Another suggestion was to levy a tax on
natural resources to encourage moderate use.3 2 This idea was par-
ing attitude of production enterprises toward nature as a free and inexhaustible
resource . . . ." Id.
27. Lisitsyn, supra note 10, at 129.
28, Id.
29. Id. A new law to protect the environment was drafted, but the govern-
ment was not prepared to enact new laws without the proper infrastructure. When
the Fishing Had to Stop, supra note 25, at 47; see also Dr. Vazken L. Parsegian, On
Helping Armenia: A Disquieting Report, ARMENIAN WKLY., May 30, 1992, at 2. The
proposed idea for restructuring included realigning the USSR government by cre-
ating 25 All-Union Ministries and State Committees to govern the "general regula-
tion of national development" and 32 Ministries and Committees to focus on "the
sectoral aspects of social-economic development." Lisitsyn, supra note 10, at 130.
In addition, the republics were to gain more contiol over the environment. Id.
This restructuring, needed to implement the laws, would take at least two years to
complete. Robinson & Waxmonsky, supra note 20, at 432. Furthermore, at least
an additional two years were needed to create the procedures and compliance
mechanisms necessary to enforce new laws. Id.
30. Lisitsyn, supra note 10, at 136.
31. Id. Minor violations of these laws by private citizens were usually punished
by administrative fines. BUTLER, supra note 9, at 280. Managers and officials that
committed environmental crimes were subjected to disciplinary actions by superior
agencies which were also bound by the law. Id. Punishments included repri-
mands, demotions, and dismissal. Id. Tort liability was also imposed on violators.
Id. at 281. Despite the strength of these laws, problems arose because punishments
could not be enforced.
The State is both the owner of the resource and, through the operations
of its departments, officials, and State-owned enterprises, the principal
violator of natural resource legislation. Fines ordinarily are effective only
against individuals, but even in instances when State officials are at fault
or when liability can be placed upon a juridical entity, responsibility in
individual cases can be very difficult to determine .... In a planned
economy an enterprise's capacity to obtain equipment often may be cir-
cumscribed by agencies or circumstances beyond its control, and this un-
avoidably has implications for traditional notions of criminal
responsibility for an omission to act ....
Id.
SCEP's fees and fines system was anticipated to be in place nationwide by
1991; this estimate was not met. Id. at 247.
32. Lisitsyn, supra note 10, at 136-37. Some argued that the amount of the
taxes was too high and fought to lower the penalties. FEsBACH & FRIENDLY, supra
note 15, at 246. For instance, one silica-processing factory was initially charged
[Vol. V: p. 163
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ticularly interesting since the USSR had historically maintained that
natural resources were public property.33 A similar suggestion in-
volved imposing fees for polluting the environment and for using
natural resources.3 4 This new law would impose such heavy fines
that it would be economically beneficial to implement environ-
mental protection devices rather than continue to pollute the
environment.3 5
Aside from the lack of economic incentives, the lack of infor-
mation and public awareness of environmental issues were also re-
sponsible for the widespread pollution in the former USSR.3 6 The
government had to stop its practice of propagandizing economic
advancement at any cost in order for Soviet citizens to recognize
the need for environmental conservation.3 7 The government could
no longer hide its environmental problems3 8 out of fear of being
unable to meet production quotas.3 9 When the government re-
structured the environmental protection system, it also had to make
45,000 rubles a year for emissions into the environment and an additional 50 ru-
bles for each ton of waste above a certain level. Id. After discussions with the
factory, the initial fine was lowered to 22,000 rubles. Id. Most factories paid high
fines until they were able to modernize their plants. See id. For a further discus-
sion of the fee system, see FESHBACH & FRIENDLY, supra note 15, at 245-48, 251.
33. Lisitsyn, supra note 10, at 137. The Soviet system was changed; no longer
would resources be free to all. BUTLER, supra note 9, at 278. In 1987, the govern-
ment began categorizing resources and issuing permits and granting rights to use
them. Id. The right to use was limited in years and was attached with obligations
to protect the resource. Id. A violation of these duties would not only result in loss
of the right to use the resource, but also criminal or administrative penalties. Id.
34. Robinson & Waxmonsky, supra note 20, at 432. For a discussion of the old
system where use of natural resources was free, see supra notes 13-15 and accompa-
nying text.
35. Nicholas A. Robinson, Soviet Environmental Law: Emerging Business Con-
straints, 506 PLI/CoMM. 191 (1989); see also BUTLER, supra note 9, at 283.
36. Axline, supra note 23, at 386; see also FESHBACH & FRIENDLY, supra note 15,
at 11.
37. Gray, High Price, supra note 11, at A19.
38. The USSR has a pervasive history of hiding environmental problems from
both its people and other nations. FESHBACH & FRIENDLY, supra note 15, at 12-13.
For instance, information about the radioactive contamination of the USSR from
the Chernobyl accident was hidden from Soviet citizens for three to four years. Id.
Furthermore, the USSR government refused to admit to other nations that an ex-
plosion had occurred until two days after the incident. Id. at 13. Even then, the
Soviets falsified the extent of the damage. Id. Eventually, Gorbachev's policy of
glasnost ("openness") helped to eliminate the secrecy. Id.
Despite glasnost, however, the CIS seems to have inherited the habit of secrecy,
as well as environmental problems, from the former USSR. Gillette, supra note 1,
at 681. When the Sosnovy Bor accident occurred in Russia, the government first
reported the radiation emission levels to be 19 times less than what they actually
were. Id. The government did not correct the report until a week later. Id.
39. Axline, supra note 23, at 384.
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its citizens environmentally conscious. 4° Furthermore, for the laws
to work, the Soviets needed to have confidence in them and a rea-
son to obey them. 4 1 To achieve this, SCEP planned to create an
extensive educational program and publish a newspaper called
Priroda to inform the citizens of environmental concerns.42
Overall, the USSR's new environmental policy set forth four
goals: (1) prevention of man-made risks; (2) eradication of past
errors in the policy; (3) conservation and protection of rare ani-
mals; and (4) restoration of monuments. 43 All levels of Soviet gov-
ernment were involved in reforming environmental policy to reach
these goals.44 As a result, these reforms, implemented after
Gorbachev took power, produced six notable differences in the So-
viet approach to environmental protection:45 (1) a more discrimi-
natory look by party leaders at costly and dubious environmental
projects; (2) an increased cognizance of the economic costs of
wasted natural resources and the consequential costs of pollution;
(3) an increased acknowledgment of environmental disasters; (4)
recognition by then-President Gorbachev of common environmen-
tal problems which could have a unifying effect among nations; (5)
new environmental groups operating free from party control; and
(6) the use of nationalistic terms in the environmental debate. 46
40. See Lisitsyn, supra note 10, at 129-130.
41. Id. at 143.
42. Robinson & Waxmonsky, supra note 20, at 191.
43. Lisitsyn, supra note 10, at 132.
44. Id. at 131. In the executive branch, a Commission on National Resources
was established. Id. An addition to the legislative branch included the Ecological
Committee of the new USSR Parliament. Id. Additionally, the legislative branch
included:
(i) Pan-Union Fundamental Principles of Legislation concerning land,
minerals, water and forests; (ii) the USSR Laws on the protection and use
of wild flora and fauna, on the protection of the atmosphere; (iii) Codes
within the Union Republics on land, minerals, water and forests; (iv) Re-
publican Laws on the protection and use of fauna, on the protection of
the atmosphere and nature conservation.
Id. at 133. Lastly, the judicial branch had a new "special body." Id. at 131. Despite -
the formation of these new bodies, it was uncertain what effect and what function
each was to serve in saving the environment. Id. This separation of powers was
new to the USSR and without a system of checks and balances, it was difficult to
predict the level of success this system would enjoy. Lisitsyn, supra note 10, at 131.
45. Ziegler, supra note 9, at 3. For a discussion of the effect of Gorbachev's
policies on the USSR, see Olga Floroff & Susan Tiefenbrun, A Legal Framework for
Soviet Privatization, 18 PEPP. L. REV. 849 (1991); ThomasJ. Samuelian, Cultural Ecol-
og and Gorbachev's Restructured Union, 32 HARv. INr'L L.J. 159 (1991); Urs W.
Saxter, Comment, The Transformation of the Soviet Union: From a Socialist Federation to
a Commonwealth of Independent States, 14 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 581 (1992).
46. Two other noteworthy changes included the openness of discussions and
the fact that non-specialists, authors, and poets for example, participated in the
debate. Id. at 6. Many of these reforms are attributable to Gorbachev's policy of
[Vol. V- p. 163
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The disaster at Chernobyl awakened the Soviet Union to the envi-
ronmental crisis it faced and was the primary impetus for these
changes.
B. The Soviet Republics
Prior to the dissolution of the USSR, the former Soviet repub-
lics believed their individual nationalities were under attack by So-
viet policies.4 7 This made resolution of the environmental
problems even more difficult.48 Along with the tension between re-
publics, non-Russian nationalities believed the USSR's concern over
the environment was limited to the Russian Republic.
49
In an attempt to remedy this, in 1989 the USSR Council of
Ministers enacted the General Principles which brought environ-
mental problems directly and exclusively under each republic's
control. 50 The republics were to "establish their own limits and
norms for extraction of natural resources, and issue all licenses and
permits to develop and use natural resources within their terri-
tory."51 They also were given the responsibility to implement
environmental laws against all enterprises within their own bounda-
glasnost. See Darst, supra note 12, at 240. See generally Keller, Public Mistrust, supra
note 17, at AlO (discussing openness of press).
47. Commission On Security and Cooperation in Europe Hearing On: Politics of Pol-
lution in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe (On the Second Anniversary of the Chernobyl
Disaster) (1988) (statement of Dr. Barbara Jancar).
48. Darst, supra note 12, at 223. For example, the Soviet government's propo-
sal to divert water from Siberia and Northern Russia, where water was abundant, to
Central Asia and the Caspian Sea, where the use of water was exceeding the supply,
caused great debate. Id. at 224, 226-27. Critics argued that this project would
flood certain areas, resulting in the destruction of many historical and cultural
monuments. Id. at 228-29. Scientists opposed the project because it would deplete
the water supply in Siberia and Northern Russia, leading to higher levels of pollu-
tion. Id. at 227-28. Scientists further argued that the Caspian Sea was not as low as
proponents for the plan argued, and in fact, that levels in the Caspian sea were
instead rising. Id. at 228. Economists argued that the costs of the project were too
high and that Central Asia mismanaged its own water supply; thus, the solution was
not to give it more water. Id. There was also opposition from the ethnic groups in
the area that did not want their resources to be used for another region. Id. at 248.
Although the opposition was kept out of the press, protests continued until
Gorbachev, who did not want to extend the capital for the project, canceled it. Id.
at 229.
49. Ziegler, supra note 9, at 6.
50. Lisitsyn, supra note 10, at 132. Prior to this enactment, most of the repub-
lics had their own legislative bodies regulating the environment. Id. at 131-32.
Under the General Principles, the republics had the power to enforce environ-
mental laws and set environmental standards. Id.
51. Id.
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ries.52 The 1990 USSR Law on Ownership made the republics re-
sponsible for the management of their own natural resources.53
C. Soviet Armenia
Notwithstanding the grave environmental problems in the
other former republics, Armenia's environment deserves special at-
tention. Five of the former USSR's most polluted cities were lo-
cated in Armenia. 54 For example, in the 1930s-40s, poor planning
resulted in the erection of forty industrial buildings within the small
geographical area of Yerevan, the capital of Armenia.5 5 Although
the USSR had environmental standards and fines for violations,
these penalties were much smaller than those imposed for failing
to meet production targets; thus, in Armenia as elsewhere in
52. Id.
53. Id. at 141-42. Prior to 1990, the former Soviet republics had demon-
strated against pollution in their regions. Latvians held a demonstration on Octo-
ber 25, 1987 to protest Latvia's pollution problems. Demonstrators Protest Pollution at
Armenian and Latvian Rallies, UKRuAINIAN WKL.,Jan. 17, 1988, at 2 [hereinafter Dem-
onstrators Protest Pollution]. Responding to rumors, citizens of the Baltic republics
complained of a nuclear waste dump in Estonia. Ziegler, supra note 9, at 6. Geor-
gian intellectuals objected to the creation of the Caucasus Mountain Railway which
would destroy the republic's beautiful terrain. Id. Plans to build a nuclear plant in
the Ukraine were halted after protests and the Chernobyl accident. Public Mistrust,
supra note 17, at A1O.
54. Raparakainutyun, supra note 8, at 8. The pollution in Vanadzor, (formerly
Kirovakan) was physically visible to the population. Interview with Maxy Kazand-
jian, former resident of Kirovakan, in Cherry Hill, N.J. (Oct. 18, 1992). On some
mornings, residents would awaken and find their city covered with a white dust
that looked like snow, but was really a chemical emitted from a nearby plant. Id.
Other mornings, the sky would be yellow. Interview with Hairabed Kazandjian,
former resident of Kirovakan, in Cherry Hill, N.J. (Oct. 18, 1992). Some days the
air would prickle people's skin and cause women's stockings to run. Interview with
Maxy Kazandjian, supra.
55. Elizabeth Fuller, Is Armenia on the Brink of Ecological Disaster?, AR ENIAN
REP., Sept. 18, 1986, at 1, 3.
Yerevan, an ancient Armenian city dating back to 782 B.C., is the Armenian
republic's capital. Philip P. Ketchian, Air Pollution in Yerevan: Causes and Effects,
ARMENL4N WKL., Aug. 1, 1992, at 8 [hereinafter Ketchian, Air Pollution in Yerevan].
Thirty-three percent of Armenia's 3.5 million residents live in Yerevan where 80%
of the utilized air basin is poisoned from pollution. Raparakainutyun, supra note 8,
at 8. The everyday air has been likened to the exhaust fumes from a jet engine.
Eric Lima, Armenia's Environmen ARMENIAN WKLY., Aug. 1, 1992, at 2.
The republic began producing chemicals in the 1930s. Raparakainutyun, supra
note 8, at 9. In 1989, official government statistics stated that over 530 million
pounds of pollutants and toxic compounds were discharged over Yerevan annu-
ally, an amount far beyond official maximum safety limits. Ketchian, Air Pollution
in Yerevan, supra, at 9. In fact, this amount may be underestimated because official
reports of industrial pollution have been falsified, probably to prevent the imposi-
tion of fines or to facilitate meeting production quotas. Id.
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the USSR, production was pursued at the expense of the
environment. 56
Armenia was the first republic to openly exercise the Soviet
Union's policy of glasnost, or "openness." 5 7 Armenians had suffered
through decades of environmental crisis, but remained silent in
fear of the Soviet regime. With glasnost, the Armenian people were
no longer afraid to voice their opinions; they took to the streets on
October 17, 1987 to publicly oppose the devastating environmental
problems that plagued their republic.58  Over 2,000 protestors
signed an appeal to the Soviet government and sent it to the Fifth
Session of the USSR's Supreme Soviet.59 The appeal called for the
closing of the Medzamor nuclear power plant and the abandon-
ment of a plan to build a second plant.6°
1. Medzamor A History of a Troubled Nuclear Power Plant
Armenians had opposed the Medzamor plant before it was
even built.61 In the late 1960s, when plans for the plant were first
56. Fuller, supra note 55, at 3. In 1985, ajoint resolution of the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union ("CPSU") Central Committee and the USSR Council of
Ministries addressed the pollution problem and adopted some reforms. Id. Some
reforms were to change the type of fuels or raw materials that some enterprises
used and to change the types of goods they produce. Id. Another reform was to
move some industries outside the city limits. Id. However, the reforms were nulli-
fied by the order to increase Armenia's industrial output by over 28%. Id. This
target for production was one of the highest targets for a republic. Id.; see also When
the Fishing Had to Stop, supra note 25, at 46 (noting lack of incentive to implement
anti-pollution targets). In 1989, the Soviet government again promised reforms
while concomitantly calling for greater use of nuclear power to foster economic
growth. Parks, supra note 4, at 14.
57. Ketchian, Air Pollution in Yerevan, supra note 55, at 8. For articles discuss-
ing glasnost, see Olga Floroff & Susan Tiefenbrun, A Legal Framework for Soviet Priva-
tization, 18 PEPP. L. REv. 849 (1991); Thomas J. Samuelian, Cultural Ecology and
Gorbachev's Restructured Union, 32 HARv. INT'L L.J. 159 (1991); Urs W. Saxter, Com-
ment, The Transformation of the Soviet Union: From a Socialist Federation to a Common-
wealth of Independent States, 14 Loy. LA. INT'L & CoMp. L.J. 581 (1992).
58. Raparakainutyun, supra note 8, at 8. Five thousand Armenians gathered in
Yerevan with banners reading "We Want Healthy Childrenl" and "Nuclear Power
Plant: A Bomb Buried in the Heart of Armenia!" Raparakainutyun, supra note 8, at
8. A year earlier, in March, 1986, 350 Armenian intellectuals wrote to CPSU Gen-
eral Secretary Gorbachev objecting to the contamination of Armenia's environ-
ment in the quest for industrialization. Fuller, supra note 55, at 1; see also Gray,
supra note 6, at 7. The letter pressed for the closing of Medzamor because of
serious leaks, the near catastrophes that the plant had experienced, and the seri-
ous health risks the plant imposed on the people. Id.
The environmental protests were the testing ground for demonstrations in
the USSR. These protests were soon followed by other nationalistic protests.
FESHBACH & FRIENDLY, supra note 15, at 232.
59. Id.
60. Raparakainutyun, supra note 8, at 9.
61. Parks, supra note 4, at 15.
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publicized, scientists objected because the plant was to be built on
the Ararat fault line.62 In addition, any leaks would contaminate
Armenia's main water supply.6 3
When Medzamor was built in 1977,64 it did not meet the Soviet
safety requirements then in effect.65 The reactor hall had a flimsy
flat iron-and-zinc roof and the reactor lacked a concrete dome. 86
The style of the plant was adapted for use in areas where uninhab-
ited land surrounds a plant, such as Russia, not in areas such as
Armenia, where a heavily populated city lay fifteen miles away.67
In the first ten years that Medzamor was active, over 150 seri-
ous accidents occurred. 68 Three incidents almost resulted in cata-
62. Id. at 15. According to leading Soviet scientists, 40 fault lines meet near
the 880-megawatt nuclear power plant. Incredibly, it was built without reinforce-
ments to make it seismically safe. Gray, supra note 6, at 7. Medzamor is located on
the Ararat Valley. Parks, supra note 4, at 14. For a further discussion of the Ararat
Valley, see supra notes 6, 55 and accompanying text.
63. Parks, supra note 4, at 15. Philip P. Ketchian, The History and Environmen-
tal Impact of Nuclear Power in Armenia, THE ARMENIAN MIRROR-SPECTATOR, Sept. 18,
1993, at 8, 9 [hereinafter Ketchian, Part One]. "The river is 25 miles in length, and
is supplied solely by underground waters, as a result of which its flow remains con-
stant throughout the year, unlike all other rivers in Armenia." Id.
64. Ketchian, Part One, supra note 63, at 1.
65. Haplin, supra note 7, at 13. For instance, nuclear plants were not to be
built closer than 15 miles from a city with a population of 300,000 or 25 miles from
a city with a population of one million people. Ketchian, Part One, supra note 63,
at 9. Yerevan is 16 miles from Medzamor and has a population of 1.3 million. Id.
Power plants were only supposed to be built in areas with the potential for an
earthquake of less than eight on the MSK-64 scale. Ketchian, Part One, supra note
63, at 9. Yerevan has the potential to reach 10 on the MSK-64 scale. Id. For a
discussion of Medzamor's power, see supra note 6.
Medzamor was listed as a plant that needed urgent extra seismic stability, but
no work was completed to make it safer. Parks, supra note 4, at 14-15. The con-
struction supervisor, Vilem Arzoumanian (also the plant's first chief engineer),
and his colleagues had demanded to no avail that the safety requirements be met.
Haplin, supra note 7, at 13. Reconstruction would have cost 450 million rubles and
would have taken 8-10 years to complete. Id. Furthermore, the plant would not
have been operable until 4 or 5 years after reconstruction. Id.
66. Haplin, supra note 7, at 13. Concrete domes are usually used in Western
plants. Id. Without a containment structure, any leaks within the plant will seep
into the atmosphere. Telephone interview with Michael Lally, Defense Analyst for
Science Applications International Corporation, (Feb. 10, 1993). Walls to contain
fires are also absent. Id.
67. Haplin, supra note 7, at 12-13; Ketchian, Part One, supra note 63, at 9. The
closest city to Medzamor is Hoktemberian. ld. This city is five miles from
Medzamor and has a population of 50,000. Id. Over 2.1 million people live within
an 18.6 mile radius of Medzamor. Id.
68. Raparakainutyun, supra note 8, at 9; see also Gray, supra note 6, at 7. Ac-
cording to the United Nations Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna, Medzamor exper-
ienced a fire in 1975. Gray, supra note 6, at 7. This was not the only fire
Medzamor experienced. After a fire and leakage at the plant in 1982, Medzamor
was shut down for 15 days. Id. The shutdown resulted in a 33% decrease in elec-
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strophic disaster.69  Some accidents resulted in radioactive
permeation of the atmosphere and contamination of the local
water system. 70
Surprisingly, the problems with Medzamor did not halt further
nuclear development in Armenia. In the early 1980's, the 27th
Party Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union or-
dered that a second, larger nuclear power plant be built near Yer-
evan to double chemical production. 71 Despite opposition, 72 the
former USSR persisted in its plans to build a sister plant until fear
inspired the government to close the plant.73
Fearing another Chernobyl, the Soviet government in 1988 an-
nounced plans to close Medzamor and to halt the erection of the
second plant.7 4 The actual shutdown was not scheduled to begin
tricity around the plant. Id. Ironically, Medzamor is to be reopened in order to
generate electricity.
69. Raparakainutyun, supra note 8, at 9.
70. Id. Information about radioactive leakage was kept from the Armenian
people. Gray, supra note 6, at 7. As a result, the inhabitants may slowly die from
the effects of the emissions and the government's failure to evacuate the area. Id.
71. Raparakainutyun, supra note 8, at 9. This plant was built 24 kilometers
from Yerevan in the Ararat Valley. Id. All of Armenia is only 29,800 square kilome-
ters, approximately the size of Connecticut. Id. The Ararat Valley contains 70% of
Armenia's cultivated land and the only source of drinking water for two-thirds of
Armenia's population. Id. The valley possesses 40 volcanoes and experiences
earthquakes which measure up to nine points on the Richter scale. Id.
72. In both May and October of 1985, members of the Armenian Academy of
Sciences sent letters to the Presidium of the Republic Academy warning that a
second plant would render Armenia a desert. Raparakainutyun, supra note 8, at 9.
Their call went unheeded. Id.
73. When the Fishing had to Stop, supra note 25, at 47; see also Keller, Public Mis-
trust, supra note 17, at A10 (discussing other cancellations); Parks, supra note 4, at
14 (discussing other cancellations).
On October 8, 1988, the party chief of the Communist Party of Soviet Arme-
nia announced plans to close Medzamor. Armenia to Close Atom Plant, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 16, 1988, at 24.
74. Wien the Fishing had to Stop, supra note 25, at 47. Two types of reactors
were used in the former USSR. Jonathan Kaufman, Faulty Nuclear Plants Imperil
East Europe, BOSTON GLOBE, March 26, 1992, at 1. One is a "Chernobyl-type" reac-
tor which does not have a containment vessel. Id. The other is a pressurized water
reactor which originally lacked safety features. Id. The model was improved; how-
ever, the metal used in the plants is now brittle and needs to be replaced. Id. In
addition, safety procedures have lapsed and instruments need replacing. Id. With
the centralized control of the plants gone, local republics are at a loss when it
comes to maintaining the plants. Id. Critics argue that the money it would cost to
make the plants safe according to western standards would be better used in im-
proving energy efficiency or developing new sources of energy in the former
USSR. Id.
Medzamor is not of the Chernobyl design. Haplin, supra note 7, at 13. Ac-
cording to the Armenian state atomic inspector, Vilem Arzoumanian, Chernobyl's
design should have made an explosion very difficult, while Medzamor's design
would facilitate an explosion. Id. The atomic inspector stated: "It has lots of pipes;
15
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until 1991. 75 In December 1988, however, Armenia experienced a
devastating earthquake. 76 Fear of another earthquake moved the
shut down date up to February of 1989. 77
2. Specific Environmental Problems
Although the first public demonstration against environmental
abuse was held in October 1987, a more subtle demonstration took
place during 1980-85 when 20,000 Armenians moved from the Ara-
rat Valley to escape the unbearable pollution. 78 The pollution has
resulted in the phenomenon of thermal inversion which has cre-
if even one of them explodes, the reactor will collapse." Id. Since an accident
occurred at Chernobyl, which was believed to be sturdier than Medzamor, it is
logical to be concerned about an explosion at Medzamor.
75. Haplin, supra note 7, at 13.
76. FESHBACH & FRIENDLY, supra note 15, at 194.
77. Parks, supra note 4, at 14. Plans to close Medzamor early came as a result
of an inspection of the plant by top Soviet scientists and foreign nuclear power
specialists who urged an immediate shutdown because the plant was seismically
unstable and because there was fear of another earthquake in Armenia. Id.
Medzamor was closed February 25, 1989, and the second plant closed on March
18, 1989. Haplin, supra note 7, at 13. The shutdown caused a one-third decrease
in electricity to the surrounding area. Id. Medzamor was the first plant to be re-
moved from service in the Soviet Union. Soviets Scrap Nuclear Plan L.A. TIMES,
Mar. 28, 1989, Part 1, at 2.
Northern Armenia suffered a massive earthquake measuring 6.9 on the
Richter scale on December 7, 1988. Parks, supra note 4, at 15. According to Soviet
authorities, Medzamor was built to withstand earthquakes reaching the magnitude
of eight points and suffered no damage. Id. at 15. However, a western earthquake
specialist stated, "'[a]n 8-point quake would probably bring down the station's prin-
cipal buildings, including those containing the control systems, and if the tremor
were directly underneath, it could easily rupture the reactor chamber.'" Id. Soviet
authorities stated that the plant would automatically close down if a quake of six or
more struck; the plant operated throughout the December quake when tremors
reached 5.5 points for close to four minutes. Id. The authorities later admitted the
dangers inherent in the plant. Id.
78. Raparakainutyun, supra note 8, at 8-9. Most people fled to southern Russia
or the northern Caucasus. Gray, supra note 6, at 7.
The major air pollutants in Yerevan are ozone, carbon monoxide, nitrogen
oxides, acidic pollutants, and lead. Harout Bronozian, Environmental Pollution in
Armenia, ARMENIAN WKLY., Oct. 24, 1987, at 8. Other serious environmental issues
facing the republic are the pollution from car emissions, the operation of a rubber
plant, Nairit, and the depletion of Lake Sevan. Ketchian, Environmental Crisis in
Armenia, supra note 17, at 9. Armenia had the most cars of all the former Soviet
Republics. Id. Even when a subway was built in 1981, people continued to use
their own personal vehicles. Id. The fuel these vehicles use is of poor quality and
accounts for 99.9% of the lead pollution in Yerevan. Id. Nairit, a synthetic rubber
plant, has been noted as Yerevan's prime polluter. Ketchian, Air Pollution in Yer-
evan; ARMENIAN WKL., Aug. 8, 1992, at 8-10 [hereinafter Ketchian, Causes and Ef-
fects]. Most of the plant's liquid chemical waste is dumped into the nearby river
called Hrazdan. Id. The vast ecological problems beyond the Medzamor plant are
beyond the scope of this Comment. See Raparakainutyun, supra note 8, at 8 (dis-
cussing Armenia's forest depletion, vegetation, and animal life). See Ketchian, Air
Pollution in Yerevan, supra note 55, at 8-10; Ketchian, Causes and Effects, supra, at 8.
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ated a dome over Yerevan.79 The result is a new type of smog called
"Yerevan smog": Los Angeles photochemical smog in the summer
and London classical chemical smog in the winter.80 The pollution
in Armenia is currently so dense that it prevents the people from
viewing Mount Ararat, their national symbol.8'
The environmental crisis has reached such proportions that
some refer to it as the second genocide of the Armenian people, a
hauntingly invisible genocide. 82 The consequences of the pollution
are apparent in the increased rates of mortality, birth defects, gas-
trointestinal and cardiovascular disease, respiratory tract and lung
problems, and infertility.83 In addition, Armenia leads the former
79. Ketchian, Air Pollution in Yerevan, supra note 55, at 8. Yerevan is shaped
like a huge amphitheater, surrounded by mountains. Id. This topography, com-
bined with the area's meteorological situation, has created a thermal inversion. Id.
[This phenomenon] occurs when colder, heavier air has drained into the
basin and is trapped under a layer of warm high-altitude air above it.
Acting as a lid, the warm air prevents the upward motion of cooler air,
thus trapping the pollutants introduced to the atmosphere from within
the basin and forming an unhealthy stationary caustic haze.
Id. For further information on the types of air pollutants, see Ketchian, Causes and
Effects, supra note 78, at 8-9.
80. Id.
81. Raparakainutyun, supra note 8, at 8. Mt. Ararat is 30 miles from Yerevan
and is 16,496 feet high. FESHBACH & FRIENDLY, supra note 15, at 16. Mt. Ararat is
located across the Armenian Republic's border in Turkey. The mountain be-
longed to Armenia before the Turkish Government invaded the country. Mount
Ararat also has historical significance. According to the Bible, Noah landed his ark
on this mountain. Genesis 8:5.
82. Raparaainutyun, supra note 8, at 8.
83. Raparakainutyun, supra note 8, at 8. For example, "[imn the past 15 years,
the number of mentally retarded children has increased five-fold, the number of
psychologically disturbed children has increased six-fold, the incidence of anemia
has increased four-fold, the number of premature births has increased seven-fold
and the number of myocardial infarctions has increased eight-fold." Id. at 8; see
also E.S. Gabrielyan, Armenian SSR Gosplan Report on the Situation Which has Developed
in Yerevan in Connection with the Existence and Development of the Nairit NPO of the
USSR Ministy of Chemical Industry, 10-11 GLASNOST IrN'o. Buu., 1987, at 11 (detail-
ing study on pollution's effects on women and children). Half of the children
born near Medzamor are either stillborn, live no longer than 40 days after birth,
have congenital defects, or are mentally handicapped. Fuller, supra note 55, at 1.
An American pediatrician stated that some of the abnormalities can be attributed
to exposure to radiation during early pregnancy. Id. at 3.
An article in the Soviet Armenian press announced that a center in Yerevan
would be opened to screen the unborn for hereditary defects. Id. at 3. This article
attempted to mollify the Armenians' fears of pollution by persuading them to be-
lieve the defects were hereditary and not from exposure to radiation or toxins. Id.
Other propaganda was issued to convince the masses that 60% of the pollution was
caused by vehicles and the other 40% by factories without proper filtering devices.
Id. Yerevan had the highest per capita car ownership rate in the former USSR and
gasoline shortages forced many to use gasoline with unrecommended octane
levels. Id.
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Soviet republics in lung, stomach, esophageal, and other cancers . 4
According to international pollution standards, an evacuation of
Yerevan residents should have been undertaken long ago.85
III. ARMENIA'S ENERGY AND ECONOMIC CRISES
Responsibility for Armenia's environmental crisis shifted into
the hands of the Armenian people when the republic declared its
independence on September 21, 1991.86 Amongst its many
problems, the new Armenian republic is currently undergoing en-
ergy and economic crises.8 7 Since only half of the megawatts of
power needed for normal life in Armenia are being produced,8
there is no heat or electricity for homes.8 9 Heat and electricity are
84. Raparakainutyun, supra note 8, at 8. The cancer rate in 1985 was four
times what it was in 1965. Id.
85. Id.
86. The new republic was officially established on September 21, 1991. Ellen
Ishkanian, 1st Anniversary of Armenia's Independence Celebrated, ARMENIAN WKLv., Oct.
3, 1992, at 10. For most new republics, environmental protection must take a back
seat to economic, political, and ethnic concerns. Sneider, supra note 9, at 10.
87. Armenia Seeks Loan for Power Plant, ARMENIAN REP. INT'L, Aug. 29, 1992, at
18; see Haplin, supra note 7, at 13. These crises caused a variety of ills for Armenia.
The President of Armenia declared a national disaster on Dec. 7, 1992 and urged
foreign countries to send help. Hugh Pope, Morale Slips as Armenians Suffer in Gold,
L.A. TimEs, Dec. 25, 1992, at A5. Armenia once had one of the highest standards of
living in the former USSR. Id. According to the United Nations, about 70% of
Armenians were living below subsistence level in 1992. Id. Half of new mothers
are unable to nurse newborns and baby food is extremely scarce. Id. The country
has little running water. Azerbaijan Pressures Georgia, ARMENIAN WKL., Dec. 5, 1992,
at 1. Agriculture is suffering. Id. Construction in the earthquake-stricken regions
has stopped. Id. Social unrest is rising. Id. All factories and schools are shut.
Armenia Pleading Case on Embargo with U.S. Leaders, OiLGRAM NEws, Dec. 18, 1992 at
1. There is no public transportation at all. Id. The temperature in most apart-
ments does not rise above 41 degrees Fahrenheit. Richard Boudreaux, Gas Line
Explosion Severs Armenia's Energy Supply, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 24, 1993, at A6. Hungry
dogs are travelling in packs attacking the people. Margaret Shapiro, Armenia's
"Good Life" Lost to Misery, Darkness, Cold, WASH. PosT, Jan. 30, 1993, at Al. Floor-
boards and botanical gardens are destroyed for firewood. Id. Drippings from
melted ice are collected in buckets for drinking water. Id. Telephones are inoper-
able and information travels only by word of mouth. Id. Most hospitals are closed.
Id. In 1988, an earthquake wiped out 50% of the republic's industrial base and left
the people to live in makeshift homes; those people are now freezing to death. See
id. Bread has been rationed by coupons. Bread in Armenia to be Rationed by Goupons,
ARMENIAN WKLY., Oct. 10, 1992, at 1. For some of the Armenians, this ration is
their only source of sustenance. Id.
88. Haplin, supra note 7, at 13; see Gas Reaches Armenia, Nuclear Power Still
Needed, REuTERs, Jan. 31, 1993, at 1. The republic is at a standstill; some areas
receive only one hour of power in ten days. Id.
89. Antranig Kasbarian, Armenia's Energy Minister in U.S., Tashjian Appeals to
Federal Agencies for Help, ARMENIAN WKLv., June 13, 1992, at 1.
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allocated only to hospitals, bakeries, and other indispensable
services. 90
Without heat and electricity, factories have been forced to
close, resulting in even harsher circumstances for the troubled
economy.9 1 With factories shut down and other industries operat-
ing at a minimum, Armenia is struggling to prevent massive unem-
ployment.92 Moreover, the attempt to adopt a market economy has
also had devastating effects on Armenia.93 This attempt coupled
with a blockade imposed by Azerbaijan on Armenia has produced
economic catastrophe. 94 Armenian food supplies are minimal.95
Supplies sent to Armenia must reach the republic through one of
three railways: two run through Azerbaijan and the other runs
90. Id.
91. Haplin, supra note 7, at 13. Ironically, industry stoppages have improved
the air. Kim Hekimian, Interns Report on Conditions in Armenia, Second Impressions:
Armenia 1992, ARMENIAN WKLY.,July 4, 1992, at 18. Many of the levels of pollution
have decreased due to the blockade and economic crisis. Id. However, once the
factories begin running again, the pollution level will increase to its pre-crisis level.
Ketchian, Causes and Effects, supra note 55, at 10.
92. Ketchian, Environmental Crisis in Armenia, supra note 17, at 8. Armenia has
faced skyrocketing unemployment since 1992. Social Unrest Growing in Armenia, AR-
MENLAN WKL., Nov. 7, 1992, at 1. Unemployment was estimated to be as high as
90% last winter. Pope, supra note 87, at AS. Some employed people have not
received paychecks for months.. Social Unrest Growing in Armenia, supra, at 1. To
increase employment, the synthetic rubber plant, Nairit, was reopened even
though the pollution controls in the plant were mostly inoperative. Ketchian Speaks
on Armenia's Environment, ARMENIAN WKLY., Nov. 21, 1992, at 3. The plant was even-
tually ordered to close in 1989. FESHBACH & FRIENDLY, supra note 15, at 16, 232,
248.
93. Pope, supra note 87, at A5. Economic instability can be seen in the de-
cline of the ruble's value. Within a month, the ruble-to-dollar exchange went from
125:1 to 190:1. Sona Dulgarian, Reflecting on Armenia, ARMENIAN WKLY., Oct. 3,
1992, at 8. The average monthly salary is 800 rubles per month. Id.
94. Dulgarian, supra note 93, at 8. Armenia's economy needs energy immedi-
ately. Armenia's Energy Minister Addresses AMAA Gathering, ARmENIAN WKL., June
20, 1992, at 5 [hereinafter Armenia's Energy Minister]. Armenia will soon enter the
sixth year of the transportation and energy blockade by AzerbaijaA. Azerbaijan Prhes-
sures Georgia, supra note 87, at 1.
95. Ketchian, Environmental Crisis in Armenia, supra note 17, at 8. Since the
winter of 1992, Armenians have protested the high prices for necessities such as
bread. Armenian Protesters Demand Bread, Higher Wages, ARMENIAN WK.LV., Nov. 7,
1992, at 1. Bread requires energy to be baked; since the nation has been import-
ing energy, prices have risen dramatically. Id. The United States, through the
"Food For Progress Program," responded to Armenia's plea for relief in November
1992 when bread was rationed and reserves of flour were depleted to a day's sup-
ply. Id. at 1, 3. The supplies were to be shipped to Turkey or Georgia and then
taken by rail or truck to Armenia. Id. at 3. However, despite shipments of wheat
from outside sources, Armenia experienced longer bread lines. Social Unrest Grow-
ing in Armenia, supra note 92, at 1.
1994]
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through Georgia. 96 The Georgian railway is inoperable due to
fighting in the area,97 and the Azerbaijani railways have been block-
aded by the Azeris for the past six years.98 Due to the blockade,
very few goods, if any, can be imported or exported.99
Armenia also has no secure source of energy. 100 The country is
incapable of handling its energy crisis because it does not have its
own fuel resources.10 Importing all its fuel has not been easy. For
example, during the winter of 1991, only a quarter of the usual
amount of imported fuel was able to reach Armenia. 10 2 The block-
ade has already forced the reopening of six hydroelectric stations
which are drying out Armenia's Lake Sevan.' 03
Although scientists are exploring other methods of obtaining
energy, new methods will take more time than Armenia has to
spare.'0 4 The last several Armenian winters have been extremely
96. Telephone Interview with Sharistan Melkonian, Executive Director, Arme-
nian National Committee (Sept. 25, 1992).
97. Turkey Agrees to Send Wheat, ARMENIAN WKLY., Sept. 26, 1992, at 1. Unrest
in Georgia has caused their rail line to Armenia to be closed. Armenian Protestors
Demand Bread, Higher Wages, supra note 95, at 3. This unrest has severely dimin-
ished gas shipments from Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan. Gas Reaches Armenia, Nu-
clear Power Still Needed, supra note 88, at 1.
98. Azerbaijan and Armenia have been warring over the Karabagh region for
the past six years. Samuelian, supra note 45, at 159. Almost all of Karabagh has
historically been populated by Armenians because Karabagh originally was part of
Armenia. Id. In 1923, under the Stalin regime, it was given to Azerbaijan. Id.
99. Ketchian, Environmental Crisis in Armenia, supra note 17, at 8.
100. Haplin, supra note 7, at 12-13. Oil supplies from Georgia are unreliable.
Id. at 12.
Sebu Tashjian, Armenia's Minister of Energy, visited the United States in
June, 1992, to ask for support during Armenia's energy crisis. Kasbarian, supra
note 89, at 1. He is also searching for help from the West to assist in deciding
whether or not to open Medzamor. Id. at 1, 4.
101. Ketchian, Causes and Effects, supra note 78, at 10. In January 23, 1993
Armenia's last source of energy from an outside source, the gas pipeline in Geor-
gia, exploded. Boudreaux, supra note 87, at A6. The pipeline was located in
Marneuli, Georgia, an area heavily populated by Azerbaijanis; Azeris are suspected
of causing the explosion. Id. Armenia has few energy sources of its own, there-
fore, it depended on pipelines from Georgia and Azerbaijan. Id. In 1990, Azerbai-
jan cut off Armenia. Id.
102. Id. Since 1989, Azerbaijan has blockaded Armenia's gas supply. Yerevan
Toxicologist Speaks in Boston, ARMENIAN WK LY., June 20, 1992, at 5; see also Armenia
Seeks Loan for Power Plant, supra note 87, at 18. For a discussion of the Azeri block-
ade against Armenia, see supra notes 94-99 and accompanying text.
103. Id. For further information on Lake Sevan, see infra notes 125-26 and
accompanying text.
104. Armenia's Energy Minister, supra note 94, at 5. Two gas pipelines are to be
built to adjoining countries, one between Armenia and Georgia, and another be-
tween Armenia and Iran. Id. Armenia also hopes to obtain diesel oil from Iran. Id.
[Vol. V: p. 163
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harsh.'05 Whereas in the past Armenia could provide a minimum
of both heat and electricity, during the winter of 1993-94 the repub-
lic will have to choose between the two.' 0 6 In all likelihood,
electricity will be forgone in order to prevent the frostbite, hy-
pothermia, malnutrition and starvation that would result from the
lack of heat.10 7
A. A Way Out: Medzamor
For many Armenians, the only way out of the energy and eco-
nomic crises appears to be the reopening of Medzamor, the nuclear
power plant that was decommissioned in 1989.108 The Armenian
government had promised a referendum to decide whether or not
to reopen the plant, 0 9 however, the referendum never took
place. 110 Although the government formally decided to reopen the
105. During the winter of 1992, Armenians ravaged the land in order to stay
warm. Wars Envelop Armenia, Corroding Environment, N.Y. Timxs, August 17, 1993, at
A2. With indoor temperatures slightly above freezing, over one million trees were
cut down for firewood. Gas Reaches Armenia, Nuclear Power Still Needed, supra note
88. Telephone poles were also chopped down and burned. Wars Envelop Armenia,
Corroding Environment, supra, at A2. Books and furniture also went up in flames as
the struggle to survive became a daily ordeal. Id. Despite efforts to stay warm,
thousands perished from lack of heat and starvation. Id. Some may argue that the
children are suffering the most. Without Aid From Outside, Armenia Faces Major Cri-
sis, ARMENIAN WKLY., Sept. 4, 1993, at 4. From March to September 1993, child
malnutrition increased 100%. Id. From April to October 1992, "monthly inci-
dence rates of measles had increased by 60%, diarrheal illnesses by 61%, viral hep-
atitis by 163%, and tuberculosis by 76%." Id.
106. Expert Predicts Minimal Heat, No Light for Armenia This Winter, ARMENIAN
WKLY., Sept. 11, 1993, at 4.
107. Id. Starvation and malnutrition would result from the inability to cook
food. Id.
108. Armenia Seeks Loan for Power Plant, supra note 87, at 18. Besides
Medzamor, a hydroelectric plant with the capacity to produce 550 megawatts has
also been shut down because its water source is the almost-deplete Lake Sevan.
Kasbarian, supra note 88, at 1, 4. For a further discussion of Lake Sevan, see infra
notes 125-26. There is also a new hydroelectric plant, "Eduard," outside of Yerevan
which is 30% complete. Kasbarian, supra note 88, at 1, 4. The Armenian govern-
ment has asked American help to complete the "Eduard" project. Rep. Lehman
Appeals For Steps To Solve Armenia's Energy Crisis, ARMENLA.N WKL., June, 13, 1992, at
3. For a discussion of Medzamor's history, see supra notes 61-77 and accompany-
ing text.
109. Haplin, supra note 7, at 13.
110. Id. In March 1993, Armenia's President convinced the parliament that
the referendum was unnecessary. Armenia PWRs Likely to Restart Without RPS, I&C
Replacements, NucioNIcs WEEK, July 5, 1993, at 2. The government abandoned
the promised referendum, stating that scientists who are more knowledgeable
should decide Medzamor's fate, not the people. Conference ofEnergy Specialists Advo-
cate Re-opening of Medzamor Nuclear Plant, ARmENLAN WKLv., Nov. 28, 1992, at 1.
1994]
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plant in April 1993,111 the plant probably will not reopen until early
1995.112 The government is still pushing for an earlier date. 113
Armenia does not have the funds to replace Medzamor's in-
strumentation and control systems or reactor protection systems." 4
Members of the Armenian Nature and Environmental Protection
Ministry ("NEPM") oppose the reopening because the plant is un-
safe and may destroy the country's environment. 115 Moreover,
some believe that the Azeri blockade will hinder the ability to ob-
tain equipment necessary to run the plant safely." 6
B. Possible Alternatives to Reopening Medzamor
Because most Armenians and NEPM fiercely oppose
Medzamor's reopening, some have searched for feasible alterna-
tives. Fortunately, Armenia may not be without alternatives to
opening Medzamor. 1 7 For instance, some argue that with Arme-
111. Wars Envelop Armenia, Corroding Environmen supra note 104, at A2.
112. Ketchian, Air Pollution in Yerevan, supra note 55, at 8; Armenia PWIs Likely
to Restart Without RPS, I&C Replacements, supra note 110, at 2.
113. Gas Reaches Armenia, Nuclear Power Still Needed, supra note 88. The govern-
ment asserts that if crews work 24 hours a day, the reopening will take place in less
than a year and a half. Id.
114. Armenia PWRs Likely to Restart Without RPS, I&C Replacements, supra note
110, at 2. The 800 million rubles the government allocated to the plant in 1993 is
enough to reopen it, but is not enough to make it safe. Haplin, supra note 7, at 13.
Estimates to safely open Medzamor range as high as $500 million. Armenia PWRs
Likely to Restart Without RPS, I&C Replacements, supra note 110, at 2. Medzamor
appears to have deteriorated in the years it has been closed. Haplin, supra note 7,
at 13. Deterioration is visible in the "radiation detectors and security devices
[which] appear broken and obsolete." Id. If Medzamor is not reopened, the coun-
try will be faced with the need to raise four billion dollars or more for a new plant.
Kasbarian, supra note 89, at 4. To make the plant safe according to Western safety
standards, $150 million is needed. Id. This amount is beyond Armenia's budget.
Id. Armenia is asking for Western loans ($100-150 million) to help it reopen
Medzamor. Armenia Seeks Loan for Power Plant, supra note 87, at 18. Some of the
plant's equipment has been lost and the control system needs to be modernized.
Armenian Nuclear Plant will Possibly be Commissioned by the End of the Year, Moscow
NEws, April 28, 1993, at 9. The government will likely have difficulty employing
skillful specialists. Id.
115. Ketchian, Air Pollution in Yerevan, supra note 55, at 8. Recently some or-
ganizations have stated that Medzamor is not as unsafe as is generally believed.
"New Chernobyl"Fears in Armenia, REUTERs, Feb. 1, 1993, at 6; see Armenia PWRs Likely
to Restart Without RPS, I&C Replacements, supra note 110, at 2. Framatome, a French
group, has stated that there are no major difficulties in the plant that would pre-
vent its reopening. Id. This organization has found the pressure boundaries of the
plant to be in good shape. Id. It appears that the closer Armenia comes to reopen-
ing the plant, the stronger the government's assertions are that the plant is safe.
Gas Reaches Armenia, Nuclear Power Still Needed, supra note 88.
116. Stopping By On The Way Home, NucL.AR NEws, June 1993, at 74.
117. Raparakainutyun, supra note 8, at 9.
[Vol. V: p. 163
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nia's wealth of natural resources, it does not need to resort to nu-
clear power. 118
Scientists suggest that Armenia can annually produce double
what is needed in kilowatt-hours of electricity without the aid of
nuclear power.1 19 Therefore, hydroelectric plants possibly could al-
leviate Armenia's energy crisis. 120 These plants can produce 25-30
billion killowatt-hours of electricity; however, only forty percent of
Armenia's hydroelectric power currently is being utilized.121 Yet,
although this solution seems feasible, it is not without its drawbacks.
Increasing hydroelectric power will deplete Armenia's water supply
and cause other environmental difficulties such as eutrophica-
tion. 122 While forty percent of Armenia's dry land could be irri-
gated by building hydroelectric plants, 23 Armenia's natural source
of obtaining food, its waterways, could evaporate as a conse-
quence. 12 4 In addition, Lake Sevan, which is evaporating due to
the drain caused by hydroelectric plants, provides Armenia with
drinking water. 125 Without Lake Sevan's supply of water, Armenian
wells will go dry, depriving Armenians of another necessity.' 26
Another alternative may be exploratory mining for coal. 127 Af-
ter weighing the need to heat schools, homes, and hospitals against
the possibility of further environmental depletion, NEPM approved
such mining. 128 However, environmental concerns arose because
the mining will take place in perhaps the most beautiful area in all
of Armenia. 129
118. Gray, supra note 6, at 7 (citing Soviet scientists' letter to Gorbachev).
119. Raparakainutyun, supra note 8, at 9.
120. Id.
121. Id.; Gray, supra note 6, at 7 (citing Soviet scientists' letter to Gorbachev).
122. The use of hydroelectric power has already depleted Lake Sevan. Ketch-
ian, Environmental Crsis in Armenia, supra note 17, at 8. The water level has
dropped 80 centimeters in the past two years. Lake Sevan Facing Evaporation Threat,
REUTERS, May 20, 1993, at 2.
Lake Sevan is the only lake where the rare Ishkhan fish can be found. Id.
With the depletion and eutrophication of the lake, this unique species will become
extinct, for the lake will be unable to support any life. Id.
123. Raparakainutyun, supra note 8, at 9.
124. Ketchian, Environmental Crisis in Armenia, supra note 17, at 8.
125. Wars Envelop Armenia, Corroding Environment, supra note 105, at A2.
126. Wars Envelop Armenia, Corroding Environment, supra note 105, at A2.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 9.
129. Id. The trees that will be destroyed in the mining process are the rarest
in Armenia. Id. The fear is that the mining will turn the priceless landscape into a
"barren moonscape." Id.
1994]
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The sun and wind are untapped resources which may also
serve as alternatives to reopening Medzamor. °30 Armenia receives
250 kilocalories per square centimeter annually from the sun's
heat.13' A project has begun to assess the possibility of using these
two sources to produce electricity.13 2 However, critics contend that
solar and wind energy, even if used, would not provide sufficient
power to run a city. 133
Another alternative to reopening Medzamor is to transform
the country's garbage into a useful resource. The refuse in the Yer-
evan city dump, after proper processing, could be used to produce
natural methane gas.13 4 The oldest section of the city dump is cur-
rendy being prepared to produce the gas.135
All of these alternatives, if feasible, would allay the need to reo-
pen Medzamor.' 36 However, Armenia is in the midst of a crisis that
needs immediate relief. Unfortunately, the lack of an immediate
alternative increases the pressure to reopen Medzamor. Although
the Medzamor solution may be the only viable one, it has been re-
jected by the people and the environmental movement of Armenia.
The new environmental movement is adamantly opposed to
any alternative that would harm the Armenian environment. In or-
der to confront the growing environmental problems, Armenian
citizens have formed the Greens Union of Armenia ("GUA").13 7
GUA is a voluntary public organization which acts within the frame-
work of the Constitution of the Republic of Armenia, international
legal guidelines, and present regulations. 38 The goals of the or-
ganization are: "[1] the inculcation of an ecological way of thinking;
[2] the resolution of basic problems of environmental protection;
[3] the prevention of ecological destruction."13 9 This strong new
130. Raparakainutyun, supra note 8, at 9.
131. Id.
132. Armenia's Energy Minister, supra note 94, at 5. The demonstration units
appear to be successful. Solar and Wind Energy Being Developed in Armenia, AR~mENA
WKLY., Sept. 4, 1993, at 12. This project has prompted USAID to become involved
in developing all types of energy resources, except nuclear, for Armenia. Id.
USAID will be "contributing $10 million a year to help Armenia become reason-
ably energy independent by the end of this decade." Id.
133. Telephone interview with Dr. Vasken Parsegian, (Sept. 7, 1992).
134. Ketchian, Air Pollution in Yerevan, supra note 55, at 8.
135. Id.
136. Armenia's Energy Minister, supra note 94, at 5.
137. Hakob Sanasarian, The Program and Regulations of the Greens Union
of Armenia (Dec. 21-23, 1990) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Villanova
Environmental Law Journal).
138. Id.
139. Id. The most important GUA goals and activities are as follows:
[Vol. V: p. 163
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1. To put before the Supreme Council of the Republic of Armenia the
necessity of passing a new Environmental Protection Law of the Republic
and approving the Ecological Code of the Republic.
2. To aid in the fulfillment of national and international environmental
protection laws and programs in Armenia.
3. To comprehensively promote the preservation of the genetic pool of
species of flora and fauna in the Republic; to implant an environmental
way of thinking in the political and economic activities of the Republic, as
well as to promote the further development and realization of programs
proceeding from the interests of the Republic.
4. To promote the rational utilization of the renewable natural re-
sources such as soil, water, wind, sun, bioenergy, etc.; and the productive
and economic utilization of nonrenewable resources.
5. To promote the restoration of ecologically clean and traditional
methods of agricultural cultivation, while simultaneously decreasing the
use of chemical fertilizers, weed-killers, and pesticides.
6. To promote the implementation and development of biogas, store-
gas and bio-humus technologies as well as the popularization of the idea
of saving energy as a "new source of energy".
7. To promote the technological modernization of industrial, agricul-
tural, energy branches of the Republic.
8. To promote the realization of a decrease in the amount of traffic
exhaust.
9. To conduct ecological assessments of projects of all acting, stipulated,
constructing or expanding enterprises, other units and programs.
10. To promote the urgent closure or improvement of enterprises that
may cause numerous victims through environmental damage.
11. To promote the gradual cessation or improvement, and moderniza-
tion [of] those enterprises polluting the environment, which are ex-
tremely dangerous for public health and do not comply with the
conditions of the Republic. The following must be taken into account:
the inadmissability of the existence of even minimal polluting chemical
large industries in Armenia, owing to its geographical position, natural
conditions and the constant danger of earthquakes.
12. To promote the neutralization of environmental pollutants with
constructions and equipment aimed at environmental protection as well
as
a) to aid in the full usage of the facilities available;
b) to assist in the completion and putting into operation of those which
are not finished;
c) to promote the development of environmental protecting facilities
and the installation of equipment in the enterprises which lack it.
13. To support the creation, establishment, and development of those
enterprises which improve the ecological conditions of the Republic.
14. To develop an inventory of the hazardous and toxic wastes of the
Republic; the safe transportation and the correct location of waste dispo-
sal sites.
15. To start a comprehensive program of treatment and recycling of
household and industrial wastes.
16. To establish independent laboratories with modern equipment
which will promote the evaluation of the qualitative and quantitative com-
position of the harmful substances contained in soil, water, air, food, and
any substance that bears any relation to people's activity.
17. To establish a databank on problems concerning the pollution of
the biosphere, public health, and general environmental problems, while
making this information available to the public.
25
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movement also opposes any of the above-mentioned alternatives to
reopening Medzamor.140
IV. INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
1 4 1
A. International Duties Regarding Nuclear Developments
When one state uses nuclear energy, every state is potentially
affected by "the possibility of radioactive contamination, the spread
of toxic substances derived from nuclear energy, and the long-term
health hazards consequent on exposure to radiation." 142 When nu-
18. To organize environmental conferences, symposiums, seminars and
consultations, demonstrations, meetings, marches, public discussions
presenting alternative programs, inquiries, and referendum data.
19. To put forward before the corresponding governmental bodies the
question of calling for juridical responsibility of those enterprises, depart-
ments and individuals whose activities or idleness cause (or have already
caused) serious harm to the public health and biosphere.
20. To collaborate with similar organizations in other countries and, if
needed, be subject to an international examination of the activities and
operations of certain enterprises in the Republic.
21. To promote the teaching of the basics of environmental science in
the pre-school institutions, schools, and higher educational establish-
ments, the installation of faculties for training environmental specialists
in universities, as well as to undertake the publication of literature.
22. To organize enterprises, laboratories, cooperatives, highly special-
ized committees promoting the fulfillment of the GUA tasks.
23. To aid in the juridical and social protection of every member of the
GUA within governmental bodies.
Id.
140. Although GUA is dedicated to passing new laws and promoting the ra-
tional use of Armenia's natural resources, Armenia lacks the technological equip-
ment needed to analyze and enforce new laws and regulations. Ketchian, Air
Pollution in Yerevan, supra note 55, at 8. Current anti-pollution devices are ineffec-
tive or improperly operated and maintained. Id. at 10. Some devices are still be-
ing designed while others exist only on paper. Id. Others were deliberately
disconnected. Id. Furthermore, resources designated for pollution cleanup have
been channeled to other uses. Id.
GUA also emphasizes the need to educate the public and develop an inven-
tory of the current pollutants. Id. As part of its efforts to educate the Armenian
people, GUA is establishing an independent environmental laboratory where citi-
zens will be able to take samples of their water, food, soil, or air for testing. Ketch-
ian, Environmental Crisis in Armenia, supra note 17, at 9.
141. For a detailed discussion on the history of international environmental
law, see Edith B. Weiss, International Environmental Law: Contemporary Issues and the
Emergence of a New World Order, 81 GEO. L.J. 675 (1993). For a discussion of
international environmental law and United States' environmental law, see David
A- Wirth, A Matchmaker's Challenge: Marrying International Law and American
Environmental Law, 32 VA. J. INT'L L. 377 (1992).
142. Boyle, supra note 17, at 257. The detrimental effect of nuclear exposure
was recognized in 1963 by a treaty which banned nuclear weapons testing in outer
space, underwater, and in the atmosphere. Id. at 258. In 1985, for environmental
reasons, the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone was created. Id. at 259; see South
Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, 1985, 24 I.L.M. 1442, 1443 (1985).
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clear energy was first used, the International Atomic Energy Agency
("IAEA") 143 believed the risks associated with nuclear energy could
be checked by the IAEA oversight and international agreements on
safety measures."4 The IAEA's expectations turned out to be opti-
mistic. When the question of state responsibility for local nuclear
developments arose, the international community could not reach
any agreements. 145
Two crises motivated the international community to cooper-
ate and seriously consider finding solutions to environmental
problems. The first was the mid-1970's oil crisis which motivated
nations to seek alternative energy sources such as nuclear power.
146
However, the use of this power cast attention to the serious environ-
mental problem of disposing of radioactive waste.147 The second
crisis was the accident at Chernobyl. Chernobyl's contamination of
eastern and western Europe prompted nations to recognize the in-
terrelation between their own environment and that of other
states.148 Governments realized the need not only to be aware of
their neighbors' nuclear activities, but to become involved in those
143. IAEA was founded in 1956. Boyle, supra note 17, at 257. IAEA's goals
are:
[To] foster research and development in the peaceful uses of nuclear en-
ergy, and the exchange of scientific and technical information; to estab-
lish and administer safeguards against the diversion to military purposes
of nuclear materials intended for use in civil nuclear programs; and to
establish or adopt health and safety standards.
Gillette, supra note 1, 398 n.216.
144. Boyle, supra note 17, at 257.
145. Id. at 259. For a further discussion of liability, see infra notes 184-85 and
accompanying text.
146. Boyle, supra note 17, at 259.
147. Id. In 1977, the United Nations General Assembly encouraged the use of
nuclear energy by all states. Id. at 257. The 1972 Stockholm Conference called for
an international agreement on radioactive waste disposal. Id. at 259. The 1983
London Dumping Convention banned nuclear waste ocean dumping. Id. How-
ever, waste disposal is still a problem. Id.
148. Id. For a further discussion of Chernobyl, see supra note 17 and accom-
panying text.
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activities. 149 In 1988, the Council of Europe1 50 was the first interna-
tional organization to call for international standards for safety and
recommend shutdowns for those facilities that did not meet estab-
lished standards. 5 1 The Council also realized the need for an insti-
tution to enforce those standards. 15 2 In addition, to be effective,
international regulations had to reflect the special needs and con-
cerns of developing nations which might lack the resources and
funds necessary to adhere to those regulations. 53
Also in 1988, the IAEA issued its Nuclear Safety Standards Pro-
gramme of 1988 which set standards for nuclear power plants' de-
sign, construction, siting, and operation. 54 Under the Programme,
the IAEA can set standards but lacks the power to enforce them.
155
However, IAEA standards are usually respected and followed since
they represent the consensus opinion of experts in the nuclear
field.156
Unlike the IAEA, the European Economic Community
("EEC") has more power to enforce the safety standards set in the
149. Boyle, supra note 17, at 259. In 1986, after Chernobyl, an obligatory min-
imum level of safety standards for reactors was almost established. Id. at 265. Such
a safety standard would require nations' current standards to be meshed into one,
states to relinquish their power to set their own standards, and expensive recon-
struction of present plants that do not meet the standard. Id. This standard
clashes with the traditional unwillingness of states to relinquish sovereignty. Phi-
lippe J. Sands, The Environment, Community and International Law, 30 HARV. INT'L
L.J. 393, 399 (1989). Furthermore, a uniform standard may not even be conducive
to better safety because different standards are needed for different areas. Boyle,
supra note 17, at 265. A further suggestion has been to increase the number of
inspections done by IAEA so that pressure may be applied to consistently bad per-
formers. Id. at 265-66.
150. The Council of Europe is an intergovernmental organization that has a
membership of 26 nations. Joel R. Reidenberg, The Privacy Obstacle Course Hurdling
Barriers to Transnational Financial Services, 60 FORDHAM L. REv. 137, 177 (1992).
The members of the Council of Europe are: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech and
Slovak Federal Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Federal Republic of Ger-
many, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg,
Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, San Marino, Spain, Sweden, Swit-
zerland, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. Id.
151. Boyle, supra note 17, at 260. The regulation of nuclear facilities is based
on health, safety, and the environment. Id.
152. Id.
153. Ved P. Nanda, Global Warming and International Environmental Law-A
Preliminary Inquiry, 30 HARv. INT'L L.J. 375, 382 (1989). For a further discussion of
developing nations, see infra notes 187-200 and accompanying text.
154. Boyle, supra note 17, at 262.
155. Id. A treaty would give IAEA more power to enforce standards for nu-
clear plants. Id. at 262-63.
156. Id. at 264.
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Euratom Treaty.1 57 This treaty was signed in 1957 "[flor the pur-
pose of creating a nuclear common market."158 The provisions of
the treaty are enforceable against the EEC members.1 59 The treaty
sets the standard for radiation at the lowest level reasonably achiev-
able.16° If a potentially hazardous activity will affect another mem-
ber state, the EEC has the power to veto the activity.1 61
In addition to formal treaties, certain customary duties exist
between nations in the international community. 162 Three of these
duties are pertinent to this discussion. First, nations have a duty to
control and regulate sources of pollution in their own jurisdic-
tion.163 Nations must not knowingly permit acts within their bor-
157. Id. at 266. For further information on the Euratom Treaty, see Samuel
B. Angus, Radioactive Waste and Euratom: Towards a More Effective Regime of Regula-
tion, 16 HASTINGS INT'L & CoMP. L. REv. 343, 361-70 (1993).
158. Angus, supra note 157, at 361 (citing EURATOM TRA.rv, art. 2, ch. IX,
1957, UN Treaty Series, vol. 298, at 162). The treaty's objectives include applying a
uniform safety standard to protect the people from radiation and ensuring non-
diversion of nuclear materials for unintended uses. Id. Radioactivity levels are
monitored through a national reporting system. Id.
159. Boyle, supra note 17, at 266. The treaty is enforced through the Court of
Justice which acts much like national courts and preempts national court deci-
sions. See Angus, supra note 157, at 361-70.
160. Boyle, supra note 17, at 266. This standard is evaluated by national re-
porting. Id. As of 1989, there were no standards for design, construction, or opera-
tion of nuclear facilities or radioactive emissions into the air or water. Id. at 267.
161. Id.
162. International law contains a psychological component described as "a
conviction felt by a state that a certain practice is required by international law."
Developments-International Environmental Law, 104 HLv. L. REv. 1492, 1504 n.73
(1991). These laws are abstract; they rarely require specific behavior and are too
vague to be instructive on acceptable behavior. Id. at 1505.
163. Boyle, supra note 17, at 269, 272. This duty has support in "United Na-
tions resolutions, in Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration of 1972, in Articles
192 and 194 of the Law of the Sea Convention, 1982, in UNEP Principles, and in
the work of the International Law Commission." Id. at 270-71 (footnotes omitted)
(citing GA Res. 2849 (XXVI) (1971); GA Res. 2995 (XXVII) (1972); GA Res. 2996
(XXVII) (1972); GA Res. 3281 (XXIX) (1974); GA Res. 34/186 (179); Report of the
UN Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm, 1972, UN Doc. A/CONF. 48/
14/Rev. 1; Principles of Conduct in the Field of the Environment concerning Re-
sources Shared by Two or More States, Principle 3, UNEP/IG/12/2, 1978, Interna-
tional Legal Materials, 17 (1978), at 1091; draft articles on International
Watercourses, Yearbook of the ILC, 1984, vol. 2, pt. I, at 101).
For example, if a plant is operated by the government, then it must be oper-
ated safely. Szasz, supra note 19, at 321. If it is not operated by the government,
then the government must enforce its regulations. Id.
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and
the principles of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their
own resources pursuant to their own environmental policies, and the re-
sponsibility to ensure activities within their own jurisdiction do not cause damage
to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national
jurisdiction.
1994]
29
Gureghian: Medzamor: Weighing the Reopening of Armenia's Unstable Nuclear Po
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1994
192 VIuANovA ENVIRONMENTAL LAwJouRNAL [Vol. V: p. 163
ders which violate their neighbors' rights. 164 That duty includes
"common areas," such as deep seabeds, outer space, the atmos-
phere, and the high seas.165 Commentators have suggested that
due diligence is the standard that should be applied to this duty.' 66
This standard is preferable because it contemplates the considera-
tion of each country's unique situation, such as a country's lack of
resources to combat environmental problems, in evaluating
liability. 167
Second, nations have a duty to cooperate with one another to
control transboundary pollution and environmental risks. 168 Ac-
cording to Article Three of the United Nation's Charter of Eco-
nomic Rights and Duties of States, "'each State must co-operate on
the basis of a system of information and prior consultation in order
to achieve optimum use of such resources without causing damage
to the legitimate interests of others.'"169 When a nation is contem-
plating an action, it must reasonably consider other nations' inter-
ests and negotiate with them about conducting the activity, even
Eshbach, supra note 2, at 272 n.9 (quoting Report of the United Nations Conference on
the Human Environment, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14 and Corr. 1, reprinted in 11 INT'L
LEGAL MATERIALS 1416, 1420 (1972)) (emphasis added).
164. Nanda, supra note 153, at 382-83. This international law principle is sim-
ilar to the "private law principle 'sic utere tuo ut alienum non luedus' which prohibits
the use of one's own property in such a way as to injure another's property." Id.
See also, Boyle, supra note 17, at 269, 270-71 (listing international recognition for
this principle).
165. Boyle, supra note 17, at 271 (citing Louis B, Sohn, The Stockholm Declara-
tion on the Human Environment, 14 HARV. INr'L L.J. 423 (1973)).
166. Id. at 272 (citing OECD, Legal Aspects of Transfrontier Pollution 380
(1977)). Due diligence has been defined as "the diligence to be expected from a
'good government,' i.e., from a government mindful of its international obliga-
tions." Developments-International Environmental Law, supra note 162, at 1496, n.22
(quoting Dupuy, International Liability for Transfrontier Pollution, in TRmNas iN
ENvr'L POL'Y & L. 363, 369 (M. Bothe ed., 1980)). This standard is desirable be-
cause it is flexible and does not make a nation "an absolute guarantor of the pre-
vention of harm." Boyle, supra note 17, at 272. This vague standard, however, may
be insufficient for environmental protection. Id. Critics argue that standards set
out in treaties would provide better protection. Id. (citing Paulo Conti & Peter H.
Sand, Methods to Expedite Environment Protection: International Ecostandards, 66 AM. J.
INT'L L. 37 (1972)).
Alternatives to the due diligence standard include the standard of strict liabil-
ity. Id. at 273. However, this alternative places too many restrictions on states be-
cause it interferes with their rights to perform lawful activities in their own
countries. Id. Furthermore, this standard ignores the lack of foreseeability of cer-
tain consequences and runs counter to the few judicial decisions already made. See
id. at 274.
167. Id.
168. Boyle, supra note 17, at 278 (citations omitted).
169. Id. (quoting GA Res. 3281 (XXIX) (1974)); see also Charter of Economic
Rights and Duties of States, art. 3, U.N. Doc. A/Res/3281, reprinted in 14 I.L.M.
251, 255 (1975).
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though consent from other states is not needed to proceed. 70
States should also notify each other about actions to be taken and
conduct impact assessments. 17' An impact assessment would illus-
trate which states are at risk because of the action and the magni-
tude of that risk.172 However, such assessments are likely to be
inaccurate since variables such as the wind will play an important
role in determining who may be injured.173 Some suggest, how-
ever, that a state cannot be expected to negotiate with every nation
when deciding where, when, and how to build a new nuclear plant
or other facility. 174
Third, nations have a customary duty to give timely notice of
accidents and emergencies to all other states that may be af-
fected. 175 Timely notice must be given to other states to allow them
to protect their people and take measures to decrease damages.' 76
Furthermore, information should continue to flow to the affected
states as long as is necessary after a nuclear disaster has occurred.177
The informing state may have a duty to offer emergency assistance
to those affected by their actions. 178
In theory, a state would be held responsible for a breach of one
of these three customary duties. 79 To state a cause of action for
170. Boyle, supra note 17, at 278.
171. Id. at 280.
172. Id.
173. Stephen C. McCaffrey, International Responsibility for Manmade Disasters,
1987 AM. SOC'Y OF INT'L L. 320, 326.
174. Id.
175. Boyle, supra note 17, at 281, 284; see also Developments-International Envi-
ronmental Law, supra note 162, at 1493.
176. Boyle, supra note 17, at 281-82. The USSR was criticized for not giving
timely notice to States that were subject to harm from Chernobyl. Boyle, supra
note 17, at 283. There are no grounds, however, "in international law for interven-
tion by neighboring States seeking to avert the consequences of a nuclear catastro-
phe, such as Chernobyl. Any attempt to take unilateral preventative action within
another State, or to render unrequested assistance in these circumstances, would
in principle appear a violation of the source State's sovergeinity." Id. at 285.
177. Szasz, supra note 17, at 321.
178. Id.
179. Boyle, supra note 17, at 287. According to the International Law Com-
mission of the United Nations, if an act is not prohibited by international law, but
it causes injury to another state, there must be physical effects for liability to attach.
Nanda, supra note 153, at 383 (citing Report of the International Law Commission on
the Work of its Fortieth Session, U.N. GAOR, 43d Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 8, U.N. Doc.
A/43/10 (1988)). Damages are primarily limited to injuries to persons and prop-
erty, not the environment. Some suggest reparations should be in accordance with
shared expectations of the states. McCaffrey, supra note 173, at 326.
Chernobyl adversely affected agriculture and livestock in Europe as well as
wildlife. Id. at 295. The governments that were harmed did not seek payment
from the Soviet Union; instead they paid their own citizens themselves. Id. at 295-
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violation of one of these duties, an aggrieved sovereign state must
prove: (1) the offending conduct is attributable to the defendant
state; (2) the breach of an international duty; (3) a causal connec-
tion between the conduct and the injury; and (4) material dam-
ages.180 There has been debate over whether these duties are
breached by negligence or whether nations can be subject to strict
liability. 181 In practice, these duties have had little practical
effect.' 8 2
Nations must work together to prevent environmental
problems that may overcome the entire planet.18 3 Education is im-
perative to meet this end; nations must be taught the importance of
their roles in the world environment. 8 4 The abundance of treaties
indicates that nations recognize a need for international standards
and regulation of the environment. 8 5
96. Victims ultimately must seek assistance from their own government; however,
not all governments are in a position to provide the help needed. McCaffrey, supra
note 173, at 329. But see Szasz, supra note 17, at 322 (discussing other international
cases where legal liability attached and was settled). That no nation filed suit
against the USSR may demonstrate nations' desires not to enforce laws against
neighboring states even when there has been a clear violation of an existing rule.
Sands, supra note 149, at 393. Failure to file suit may also be explained as a polit-
ical move. Further, states may not want to bring suit because they know they may
be the perpetrators tomorrow. Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Soft Law and the International
Law of the Environment, 12 MICH. J. INT'L L. 420, 435 (1991).
In theory, nations will be held responsible for breaches, but in actuality, the
vagueness of these duties leaves room for violating nations to claim that their con-
duct met international duties. Developments-International Environmental Law, supra
note 162, at 1493. In addition, other nations seem unwilling to pursue enforce-
ment because none want to relinquish the sovereignty that is required for enforce-
ment. Id. at 1501.
180. Id. at 1494 (citing Gunther Handl, Territorial Sovereignity and the Problem of
Transnational Pollution, 69 Am.J. INT'L L. 50, 74 (1975)). Those found liable would
be required to pay damages. Szasz, supra note 17, at 322.
181. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
182. For instance, the procedural requirements of a duty to assess damages
and inform surrounding countries of activities is not violated until after the pollu-
tion since another nation must suffer damages. Developments-International Envi-
ronmental Law, supra note 162, at 1512. In addition, the duty to inform and assess
does not require a country to change their activity once an assessment has been
made. Id. at 1513-20. The duty is satisfied by disclosure and imposes no further
obligations. Id.
183. Nanda, supra note 153, at 378 (citing Greenhouse Effect and Global Climate
Change: Hearings Before the Senate Commission on Energy and National Resources, 100th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1987)).
184. Id. at 390.
185. Sachiko Kuwabara, International Responsibility for Manmade Disasters, 1987
Am. Soc'Y OF INT'L L. 320, 324. Treaties can be improved by including a clarifica-
tion of the standard of care to prevent, control and mitigate environmental catas-
trophes. Id. Treaty law would also be improved by a broader definition of
recoverable damages and the establishment of an international procedure and
body to settle claims. Id. at 324-25.
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B. Developing Countries
Nations must recognize the special needs and concerns of de-
veloping nations when formulating rules for environmental protec-
tion. The foregoing duties may not be applicable to devolping
nations due to their underdeveloped status.' 8 6 These countries are
less willing to comply with international agreements and standards
on the environment out of fear that their development will be
slowed.'8 7 Their participation in international discussions on the
environment stems only from a desire to be informed and to dis-
cover how development may be coupled with environmental preser-
vation.188 Although these nations may attend discussions, they do
not wish to be bound by the ultimate decisions that result.18 9 At the
1972 Stockholm Conference, developing nations indicated "that
the needs of environmental conservation must be harmonized with
those of development."190 The international community must rec-
ognize that developing nations must address their immediate needs
before addressing environmental issues.' 91
One suggested method of gaining compliance from develop-
ing nations is to offer them a lower standard of liability for environ-
mental transgressions. 92  This suggestion recognizes that
developing nations simply cannot afford to pay exorbitant damage
awards for harming the environment.1 93 Another possible method
is to delay the developing nations' compliance to standards for a
certain number of years.' 94 For instance, the Montreal Protocol al-
186. Kilaparti Ramakrishna, International Responsibility for Manmade Disasters,
1987 AM. SOC'Y OF INT'L L. PROC. 320, 337.
187. Id. In addition, developing nations have requested payment from devel-
oped nations since the former nations paid no attention to the environment while
the latter were developing. Catherine Tinker, Note, Environmental Planet Manage-
ment by the United Nations: An Idea Whose Time Has Not Yet Come?, 22 N.Y.U.J. IrNrr'L L.
& POL. 793, 812 n.79 (1990). Developing nations believe developed nations
should pay for the environmental harm already caused. Developments-International
Environmental Law, supra note 162, at 1500. Many developing nations do not feel
bound by "customary" international duties which were established before their
existence or created by other nations. Id. at 1505 (citing LUNC-CHU CHEN, AN IN-
TRODUCTION TO CoNTEMpORARY INTERNATIONAL LAw 406 (1989)).
188. Ramakrishna, supra note 186, at 337.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. John Ntambirweki, The Developing Countries in the Evolution of an Interna-
tional Environmental Law, 14 HASTINGS Ir'L & COMp. L. REv. 905, 910 (1991).
192. L.F.E. Goldie, International Responsibility for Manmade Disasters, 1987 AM.
Soc'Y OF INT'L L. PROC. 320, 339. Strictness could vary with the economic develop-
ment of each state. Id.
193. Id.
194. Ntambirweki, supra note 191, at 910.
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lows developing countries ten years to comply with the control
measures necessary to protect the ozone layer so long as they ad-
here to a lower minimum standard. 195 This would help developing
nations meet their immediate needs, yet still acknowledge the need
for their compliance with international standards. 196
Finally, some have suggested establishing a fund so that devel-
oping countries can secure loans or receive grants in order to im-
plement environmental legislation. 97 Such a fund was created
under an amendment to the Montreal Protocol.1 98 This fund was
designed to provide "financial transfers and technical cooperation"
to developing nations to help them comply with the Montreal Pro-
tocol environmental control measures.' 99 A grant system was also
established by the World Bank through its new Global Environmen-
tal Facility ("GEF"). 200
C. Suggested Improvements to International Environmental
Regulations
International environmental law is uncoordinated, slow, and
cumbersome. 20' There are no institutional or legal mechanisms to
make international laws effective. 20 2 The international community
needs an agency within the United Nations that has the power to
enforce environmental laws.20 3 This agency would transform inter-
195. Id. (citing Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, 26
INT'L LEGAL MAG. 1550 (1987)). The Montreal Protocol used as a framework the
1985 Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer. Id. (citing Vienna
Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, 26 INT'L LEGAL MAG. 1529 (1987)). It
"seeks to protect the stratospheric ozone layer through the control of deleterious
emissions.. .. " Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 914.
198. Id. at 913.
199. Ntambirweki, supra note 191, at 913.
200. Id. at 914-15.
201. Geoffrey Palmer, New Ways to Make International Environmental Law, 86
Am. J. INT'L L. 259, 271 (1992).
202. Id.
203. Id. The United Nations' activities in the environmental field are limited
to "information-gathering, monitoring, and rule-making," not enforcement.
Tinker, supra note 187, at 795. Currently, the United Nations enforces interna-
tional law through the International Court of Justice ("ICJ") which has limited
jurisdiction. Id. at 806. For a further discussion of the ICJ, see Developments-Inter-
national Environmental Law, 104 HARv. L. REv. 1487, 1499-1503 (1991). For a de-
tailed discussion on the United Nations Environment Programme, see Tinker,
supra note 187, at 793.
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national environmental law from "soft law" to "hard law."2 04 Soft
law is either law not yet in existence or a combination of things not
all law.20 5 Soft law itself is not legally binding.20 6 Even soft law,
though, can be helpful in determining obligations and everyday de-
cisions.207 Soft law essentially serves as a list of established interna-
tional values.208
Another suggestion is to abolish the need for unanimous con-
sent to international agreements. 2°9 Although unanimous consent
generates a feeling of cooperation among nations, it weakens the
law. 210 In reaching a unanimous decision, each nation extracts a
portion of the law it does not like; in the end, the law is left impo-
tent.211 Furthermore, one nation has the power to block the law
completely.212 Some recent international agreements include a
provision limiting the need for unanimous consent.213 In these
agreements, nations unanimously agree to be bound by any provi-
sions on which a certain number of participating states agree.214
The abandonment of unanimous consent requires the relinquish-
ment of some state sovereignty, but it is in every state's interest to
relinquish this power to further important international goals. 2 15
Recently, the Pan-European Energy Charter (the "Charter")
was designed specifically to deal with the Commonwealth of In-
dependent States ("CIS"),216 of which Armenia is a member, and its
204. Dupuy, supra note 184, at 431. Hard law is binding and usually is found
in treaties. Tinker, supra note 193, at 802. The parties to the treaty, and occasion-
ally third parties, are bound to the treaty. Id.
205. Dupuy, supra note 179, at 420.
206. Id. at 429.
207. Id. at 435.
208. Palmer, supra note 201, at 269.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Palmer, supra note 201, at 264.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id. Many international agreements hesitate to withdraw sovergnity from
a state. See Gillette, supra note 1, at 410-11. However, sovereignty need not pose
such an obstacle to a binding agreement between nations; for example, treaties are
reached by exchanging some sovereignty for another good. See Developments-Inter-
national Environmental Law, supra note 162, at 1503. For a detailed discussion of
sovereignty versus global concerns, see Eshbach, supra note 2, at 271.
216. The CIS is comprised of eleven of the fifteen former Soviet Republics:
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Moldova, Kazakhastan, Kirghizstan, the Russian Fed-
eration, Tadjikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. Gillette, supra note
1, at 376 n.5.
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nuclear reactors.217 The main goal of the Charter is to create a
framework "for trade and cooperation in the field of energy, and to
promote and guide the restructuring of Eastern Europe's energy
industries."218 The Protocol calls for cooperation among members
of the international community to improve nuclear safety.2 19 The
main goals for regulating domestic conduct are "to develop nuclear
regulatory organizations in each country, to improve reactor safety,
and to develop waste management plans."220 The main goals for
international conduct are to focus on "international organizations
as sources of information, on international consultation concerning
transboundary safety effects, and on international alternative en-
ergy studies." 221
V. MEDZAMOR: AN ASSESSMENT OF LIABILITY
If Armenia reopens Medzamor, it must control the disastrous
consequences that may follow. In maintaining this control, Arme-
nia must at least exercise due diligence.2 22 Since due diligence con-
siders each nation's particular situation, it is questionable how
much control Armenia, a nation in a dire condition, will have to
exercise to limit its liability should an accident occur.
Arguably, Armenia would not violate its international environ-
mental duties by reopening Medzamor. Since the due diligence
standard takes into consideration the circumstances of the offend-
ing nation, Armenia could possibly be free from liability since it is
plagued with energy and economic crises. Armenia is in a dismal
predicament; it lacks the equipment and anti-pollution devices to
operate Medzamor safely. It also lacks funds to restart Medzamor
safely, it lacks food, heat and electricity for the people.
Even if liability were imposed on Armenia if Medzamor ex-
ploded, Armenia would be in no position to pay for the resulting
217. Id. at 377. "The Charter is a statement of political intent among the
signatories to establish a binding Basic Agreement and Protocols addressed to vari-
ous areas of trade and cooperation in the energy field." Id. The Basic Agreement
and the Protocols have not yet been finalized, but once they are, they will have "the
political authority of a treaty." Id. For a comprehensive analysis of the Charter
and suggested improvements, see Gillette, supra note 1, at 375.
218. Gillette, supra note 1, at 395 (citing More than 45 Countries Sign European
Energy Charter, Irr'L ENwr'L DAILY, Jan. 15, 1992, at 19).
219. Id. at 401 (citing Draft of the Protocol of Principles Governing the Peace-
ful Uses of Nuclear Energy and Safety of Nuclear Installations, art. 3, Jan. 28,
1993).
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. For a discussion of the due diligence standard, see supra notes 166 and
accompanying text.
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damage suffered by other nations, or the damages to even its own
nation. Since international law is soft law, Armenia could not be
forced to pay for the injuries it caused.
If Medzamor reopens, there is a high risk that a nuclear acci-
dent will occur at the plant. Such an accident would spread nuclear
contamination to other nations, as did the fallout from Chernobyl.
Although any nation that suffered damages may look to Armenia
for reparation, Armenia will be unable to pay for the damages. As a
result, the international community would best be able to protect
itself by assisting Armenia in preventing an accident, rather than
seeking reparation after an accident occurs.
As discussed earlier, there is a customary duty to cooperate
with other nations. However, given Armenia's choices, it is unlikely
that the government will heed any of its neighbors' pleas to not
open the plant.2 23 The most Armenia's neighbors will be able to do
to protect their own interests will be to help Armenia open the
plant safely. After the opening, foreign nations may also have to
watch the plant to ensure its safe operation. Ordinarily, the nation
opening the plant has this duty. However, in this instance, a nation
like Armenia may need to shift this burden to nations that are in a
better position to carry out the obligation. 224
VI. CONCLUSION
If foreign nations intervene to cure Armenia's energy and eco-
nomic crises, they can help end the resulting environmental crises.
223. After all, if Medzamor had an accident like the one at Chernobyl, Yer-
evan would be uninhabitable. Ketchian Speaks on Armenia's Environment, supra note
95, at 3. Therefore, it is obvious that survival is the nation's top priority; environ-
mental concerns are only secondary. Id.
224. A Member of the United States House of Representatives has stated that
"[mierely to applaud countries who fought for democracy is not enough. The
world must provide the technical assistance to successfully complete the transfor-
mation." Rep. Lehman Appeals for Steps to Solve Armenia's Energy Crisis, supra note 108,
at 3. Although international law imposes no legal obligation on other countries to
help, it recognizes that developing countries should be given special assistance. In
addition, when a nation suffers catastrophe, it is not uncommon for foreign na-
tions to come to the rescue if the nation itself is unable to cope with the disaster.
For example, in 1988, when a massive earthquake devastated Armenia, foreign aid
poured into the republic. Se Jim Naughton, Afiershock of the Quake; Relief Workers
Relive Their Armenia Experience, THE WASH. Posr, Jan. 7, 1989, at GI; Armenia -
Earthquake Relief Aid, TAss, Jan. 25, 1989, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library. Given
this fact, it is only logical to conclude that nations willing to aid in cases of unpre-
dictable catastrophe should be willing to aid in the prevention of predictable ones.
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Resolving the issue of Karabagh question is key to ending Arme-
nia's energy and economic crises.2 25
One method of rescuing Armenia from its economic turmoil is
to send non-military or humanitarian aid to Armenia. Organiza-
tions within the United States already have offered such aid.2 26 To
further rectify the situation, other nations could attempt to provide
Armenia with an alternative energy source. Some believe that
strengthened ties with foreign nations and the importation of or-
ganic fuels from Iran, Iraq or Turkey will eliminate the need to
open Medzamor. 227
225. For a discussion of the Karabagh problem, see supra notes 97-105 and
accompanying text. Five hundred thousand refugees have fled the massacre of
Armenians in Azerbaijan and Karabagh seeking bare necessities such as food, shel-
ter, employment and medical attention. Armenian Foreign Minister Meets with
Eagleburger, ARMENIAN WKLY., Oct. 3, 1992, at 13. Furthermore, the blockade of
Armenia by the Azeris has kept out the supplies Armenia needs to keep from re-
opening Medzamor. Sometimes, supplies sent to Armenia have been halted on
railroads for three months. Armenia Pleading Case on Embargo with U.S. Leaders,
supra note 90, at 1. Even after Armenia has paid for fuels, it has no way to import it
since the rail lines are blockaded. Id. Armenia requested that United States help
convince Turkey and Georgia to establish "humanitarian corridors" which would
provide paths for food to reach Armenia and alleviate some of the impact of the
Azeri blockade. Id.
226. The United States Agency for International Development and the De-
partment of Energy has designated $15.6 million to the former republics for en-
ergy assistance. Thomas F. Berg, USAID, DOE Reach Out to Former Soviet States, 130
No. 4 FoRTNiwrrr, Aug. 15, 1992, at 7. Energy efficiency and nuclear power plant
safety are two issues to be addressed with the funds. Id. The United Armenian
Fund has sent $55 million of humanitarian aid to Armenia since the earthquake.
UAF's 58th Airlift Arrives in Yerevan, ARMENAN WKLY., Sept. 11, 1993, at 5. In addi-
tion, several Armenian-Americans helped to create a new environmental engineer-
ing program for the State Engineering University of Armenia. Environmental
Engineering Program to Start at SEUA in Armenia, ARMENIAN WKLY., July 11, 1992, at 5.
One of the courses will cover solid and water waste. Id. This program aims to
teach the students how to solve Armenia's environmental problems. Id.
227. Haplin, supra note 7, at 13. Turkey has expressed some fear concerning
the possibility of an accident at Medzamor. Gas Reaches Armenia, Nuclear Power Still
Needed, REuTrrEs, supra note 88. The plant is not far from the Turkish border. Id.
Turkey talked about supplying Armenia with electricity; however, this action would
only take place if Armenia renounced its territorial claims and charges of the Ar-
menian massacre from 1915. Id. In addition, such action would be seen as traitor-
ous by the Azeris. Id.
In 1992, Iran held a Regional Energy Meeting to discuss the possibility of aid-
ing Armenia and other former Soviet republics by connecting them to seas with
pipelines. Iran to Host Regional Energy Meeting, AamLNAN REP. INT'L, Aug. 29, 1992,
at 18. Armenia agreed to buy 500,000 metric tons of fuel oil a year from the Ira-
nian National Oil Company. U.S. Executive Fights to Light up Armenia as Energy Minis-
ter, WASH. PosT, June 1, 1992, at B9.
Other countries have also offered assistance. The President of the Interna-
tional Association of Atomic Engineers, also former chairman of Britain's electric-
ity industry, appeared willing to help the new republic when he visited Medzamor
in December 1991. Haplin, supra note 7, at 13.
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MEDZAMOR
Another option would be to lend assistance to insure the safe
reopening of the Medzamor plant.22 8 There are several reasons
why countries may be willing to work for a safe reopening despite
their lack of a duty to do so. Western countries would help for two
reasons: (1) to gain lucrative contracts for nuclear reactor upgrad-
ing and construction, 229 and (2) to improve the public's perception
of nuclear energy worldwide.230 Eastern countries would assist out
of fear of accidents at the reactors which will affect the safety and
health of their own citizens. 23' This option would require greater
effort in lending Armenia money and sending specialists to Yerevan
to inspect and repair the plant.23 2
Armenia's environmental crisis has climaxed since the time of
Soviet domination. As the new nation struggles to survive, it
searches for ways to feed and heat its people during another bitter
winter. In the backdrop of disaster looms the Medzamor nuclear
power plant, dormant and tantalizing. In the city of Yerevan it
stands as a symbol of hope and fear.23 3 The reopening may relieve
228. In late 1992, an international conference was held to evaluate the re-
opening of Medzamor. Conference of Energy Specialists Advocate Re-opening of
Medzamor nudearplant, ARMENIAN WKLY., Nov. 28, 1992, at 1. After the conference,
specialists agreed to advocate the re-opening of Medzamor in order to alleviate
Armenia's need for energy. Id. In economic terms, this solution costs less than
buying energy from other nations. Id. Environmentally, the costs may be ex-
tremely high. Id. Since Medzamor's shutdown, parts of the plant have been sold
to other countries and other parts have been stolen. Id. If Medzamor is re-
opened, it will be the first time ever that a nuclear plant that was "permanently"
shutdown was re-opened. Id.
229. Id.
230. Gillette, supra note 1, at 389. Improving safety at CIS reactors will reduce
the chances of accidents and thus improve the public's perception. Id.
231. Id. Eastern countries may also be motivated by the possibility of procur-
ing construction contracts. Id.
232. Some countries and organizations have moved to adopt this approach.
For instance, Russia has agreed to help Armenia in restarting the plant. Russia
Conditions help to Armenia in Restarting Nuclear Plan4 THE TELEGRAPH AGENCY OF THE
SOVIET UNION TASS, Sept. 6, 1993. In addition, the IAEA has visited the plant and
deemed it technically ready to start. Medzamor Nuclear Plant Fit for Work Claims Ex-
pert, ARMENIAN WKLY., Sept. 4, 1993, at 1. IAEA stated that it will help restore the
plant and has invited Armenia to join its organization. Id. Armenia seems to be
begging for aid from any nation that will offer assistance, even from a nation that
once massacred two thirds of her population-Turkey.
233. Medzamor
Crisis in our homeland,
"Isolated" from the world,
With no other alternative,
We turn to you with hope
and fear
And we ask, voices quivering:
"If we give you life,
will you save us,
or destroy us?"
19941
39
Gureghian: Medzamor: Weighing the Reopening of Armenia's Unstable Nuclear Po
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1994
202 ViLLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAw JouRNAL [Vol. V: p. 163
the people of the long endured energy and economic crises, but it
will also invite environmental disaster. An explosion at Medzamor
would devastate not only Armenia, but surrounding nations. Con-
sequently, the world must recognize a new duty of nations to aid an
economically embattled country whose only option for survival is to
reopen a nuclear power plant that could potentially destroy the re-
gion's environment. As the international community struggles to
save the environment within its own borders, it must remember that
"[t] he actions of one nation could render nugatory the actions of all
the others."23 4
Tamara C. Gureghian
Tamara C. Gureghian, Medzamor (Sept. 24, 1992) (unpublished poem, on file
with the Villanova Environmental Law Journal).
234. Palmer, supra note 201, at 259 (referring preservation of global
environment).
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